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Abstract. The notion of refinement plays an important role in software engineering. It is
the basis of a stepwise development methodology in which the correctness of a system can
be established by proving, or computing, that a system refines its specification. Wang et
al. describe algorithms based on antichains for efficiently deciding trace refinement, stable
failures refinement and failures-divergences refinement. We identify several issues pertaining
to the soundness and performance in these algorithms and propose new, correct, antichain-
based algorithms. Using a number of experiments we show that our algorithms outperform
the original ones in terms of running time and memory usage. Furthermore, we show
that additional run time improvements can be obtained by applying divergence-preserving
branching bisimulation minimisation.
1. Introduction
Refinement is often an integral part of a mature engineering methodology for designing
a (software) system in a stepwise manner. It allows one to start from a high-level speci-
fication that describes the permitted and desired behaviours of a system and arrive at a
detailed implementation that behaves according to this specification. While in many settings,
refinement is often used rather informally, it forms the mathematical cornerstone in the
theoretical development of the process algebra CSP (Communicating Sequential Processes)
by Hoare [Hoa85, Ros94, Ros10].
This formal view on refinement—as a mathematical relation between a specification
and its implementation—has been used successfully in industrial settings [GB16, GBC+17],
and it has been incorporated in commercial Formal Model-Driven Engineering tools such
as Dezyne [vBGH+17]. In such settings there are a variety of refinement relations, each
with their own properties. In particular, each notion of refinement offers specific guarantees
on the (types of) behavioural properties of the specification that carry over to correct
implementations. For instance, trace refinement [Ros10] only preserves safety properties.
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The—arguably—most prominent refinement relations for the theory of CSP are the stable
failures refinement [BKO87, Ros10] and failures-divergences refinement [Ros10]. All three
refinement relations are implemented in the FDR [GABR14, GABR16] tool for specifying
and analysing CSP processes.
Trace refinement, stable failures refinement and failures-divergences refinement are
computationally hard problems; deciding whether there is a refinement relation between an
implementation and a specification, both represented by CSP processes or labelled transition
systems, is PSPACE-hard [KS90]. In practice, however, tools such as FDR are able to
work with quite large state spaces. The basic algorithm for deciding a trace refinement,
stable failures refinement or a failures-divergences refinement between implementation and
specification relies on a normalisation of the specification. This normalisation is achieved
by a subset construction that is used to obtain a deterministic transition system which
represents the specification.
As observed in [WSS+12] and inspired by successes reported, e.g., in [ACH+10, DR10,
WDHR06], antichain techniques can be exploited to improve on the performance of re-
finement checking algorithms. Unfortunately, a closer inspection of the results and algo-
rithms in [WSS+12], reveals several issues. First, the definitions of stable failures refine-
ment and failures-divergences refinement used in [WSS+12] do not match the definitions
of [BKO87, Ros10], nor do they seem to match known relations from the literature [vG19].
Second, as we demonstrate in Example 4.2 in this paper, the results [WSS+12, The-
orems 2 and 3] claiming correctness of their algorithms for deciding both non-standard
refinement relations are incorrect. We do note that their algorithm for checking trace refine-
ment is correct, and their algorithm for checking stable failures refinement correctly decides
the refinement relation defined by [BKO87, Ros10].
Third, unlike claimed by the authors, the algorithms of [WSS+12] violate the antichain
property as we demonstrate in Example 4.4. Fourth, their algorithms suffer from severely
degraded performance due to sub-optimal decisions made when designing the algorithms,
leading to an overhead of a factor |Act | · |S |, where Act is the set of actions and S the set
of states of the implementation, as we show in Example 4.3. This factor is even greater,
viz. |Act ||S |, when using a FIFO (first in, first out) queue to realise a breadth-first search
strategy instead of the stack used for the depth-first search. Note that there are compelling
reasons for using a breadth-first strategy [Ros94]; e.g., the conciseness of counterexamples to
refinement.
Our contributions are the following. Apart from pointing out the issues in [WSS+12],
we propose new antichain-based algorithms for deciding trace refinement, stable failures
refinement and failures-divergences refinement and we prove their correctness. We compare
the performance of the trace refinement algorithm and the stable failures refinement algorithm
of [WSS+12] to ours. Due to the flaw in their algorithm for deciding failures-divergences
refinement, a comparison of this refinement relation makes little sense. Our results indicate
a small improvement in run time performance for practical models when using depth-
first search, whereas our experiments using breadth-first search illustrate that decision
problems intractable using the algorithm of [WSS+12] generally become quite easy using
our algorithm. Finally, we show that divergence-preserving branching bisimulation [vG93,
vGLT09] minimisation preserves the desired refinement checking relations and that applying
this minimisation as a preprocessing step can yield significant run time improvements.
The current paper is based on [LGW19], but extends it in several respects. First,
in addition to stable failures refinement and failures-divergences refinement, the current
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exposition also includes a treatment of trace refinement. Second, we include detailed proofs of
correctness of the main claims in [LGW19], and we include several results that are needed to
support these claims, but which are also of value on their own. Third, we expand further on
our experimental results. In particular, we have included more performance metrics, to help
explain the observed performance improvements of our algorithms over those of [WSS+12],
and we have included a section on using divergence-preserving branching bisimulation for
preprocessing.
Outline. In Section 2 the preliminaries of labelled transition systems and the refinement
relations are defined. In Section 3 a general procedure for checking refinement relations is
described. In Section 4 the antichain-based algorithms of [WSS+12] are presented and their
issues are described in detail. In Section 5 the improved antichain algorithms are presented
and their correctness is shown. Finally, in Section 6 an experimental evaluation is conducted
to show the effectiveness of these changes in practice, followed by the evaluation of applying
divergence-preserving branching bisimulation minimisation as a preprocessing step.
2. Preliminaries
In this section the preliminaries of labelled transition systems and the considered refinement
relations are introduced.
2.1. Labelled Transition Systems. Let Act be a finite set of actions that does not contain
the constant τ , which models internal actions, and let Actτ be equal to Act ∪ {τ}.
Definition 2.1. A labelled transition system L is a tuple (S , ι,→) where S is a set of states;
ι ∈ S is an initial state and →⊆ S ×Actτ × S is a labelled transition relation.
We depict labelled transition systems as edge-labelled directed graphs, where vertices represent
states and the labelled edges between vertices represent the transitions. An incoming arrow
with no starting state and no action indicates the initial state. We use the initial state to
refer to a depicted LTS.
We adopt the following conventions and notation. The following definitions are in the
context of an arbitrary LTS L = (S , ι,→). Typically, we use symbols s, t, u to denote states,
U, V to denote sets of states and a to denote actions. A transition (s, a, t) ∈→ is also written
as s a−→ t. The set of enabled actions of state s is defined as enabled(s) = {a ∈ Actτ | ∃t ∈ S :
s
a−→ t}.
A sequence is denoted by concatenation, i.e., a0 a1 · · · an−1 where ai ∈ Actτ for all
0 ≤ i < n is a sequence of actions and Actτ ∗ indicates the set of all finite sequences of actions.
We use σ and ρ to denote a sequence of actions, where ρ typically does not contain τ . The
length of a sequence, denoted as |a0 a1 · · · an−1|, is equal to n. Finally, we say that any
sequence a0 a1 · · · ak such that k ≤ n− 1 is a prefix of a sequence a0 a1 · · · an−1. A prefix is
strict whenever its length is strictly smaller than n− 1.
The transition relation of an LTS is generalised to sequences of actions as follows: s −→ t
holds iff s = t, and s σ a−−→ t holds iff there is a state u such that s σ−→ u and u a−→ t. The weak
transition relation  ⊆ S ×Act × S is the smallest relation satisfying:
• s  t if there is some sequence σ ∈ τ∗ such that s σ−→ t,
• s a t if s a−→ t for a ∈ Act , and
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• s ρ σ t if there is a state u such that s ρ u and u σ t.
Definition 2.2. Traces, weak traces and reachable states are defined as follows:
• a sequence σ ∈ Actτ ∗ such that s σ−→ t is called a trace. The traces starting in state s are
defined as traces(s) = {σ ∈ Actτ ∗ | ∃t ∈ S : s σ−→ t}. We define traces(L) to be traces(ι).
• a sequence ρ ∈ Act∗ such that s ρ t is called a weak trace. The weak traces starting in
state s are defined as weaktraces(s) = {ρ ∈ Act∗ | ∃t ∈ S : s ρ t}. We define weaktraces(L)
to be weaktraces(ι).
• the set of states, reachable from s is defined as reachable(s) = {t ∈ S | ∃σ ∈ Actτ ∗ : s σ−→ t}.
We define reachable(L) to be reachable(ι).
Definition 2.3. Labelled transition system L is:
• deterministic if and only if for all states s, t, u and actions a ∈ Actτ if there are transitions
s
a−→ t and s a−→ u then t = u.
• concrete if it does not contain transitions labelled with τ , i.e., for all states s it holds that
τ /∈ enabled(s).
Lemma 2.4. Let L be a deterministic LTS. For all sequences σ ∈ Actτ ∗ and states s, t, u ∈ S ′
if s σ−→ t and s σ−→ u then t = u.
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the length of all sequences in Act∗ and is
routine.
The models underlying the CSP process algebra [Hoa85, Ros10] build on observations of (in
the terminology of CSP) traces, failures and divergences. A trace observation records the
visible actions that occur when performing an experiment on the system; trace observations
thus coincide with weak traces. A failure is a combination of a set of actions that a system
observably refuses and a trace experiment on the system that leads to the observation of
the refusals. A refusal can only be observed when the system has stabilised, meaning that it
can no longer perform internal behaviour. A divergence can be understood as the potential
inability of the system to stabilise, which can happen when the system engages in an infinite
sequence of τ -actions after performing an experiment on the system.
We next formally define the above notions, following the standard conventions and
definitions of [BR84, Ros10, vG17].
Definition 2.5. A state s is stable, denoted by stable(s), if and only if τ /∈ enabled(s). For
a stable state s, the refusals of s are defined as refusals(s) = P(Act \ enabled(s)). For a set
of states U ⊆ S its refusals are defined as refusals(U) = {X ⊆ Act | ∃s ∈ U : stable(s) ∧X ∈
refusals(s)}.
Remark 2.6. The definition of refusals provided in [WSS+12] differs from Definition 2.5:
it defines, for a stable state s, refusals(s) = {X | ∃s′ ∈ S : (s  s′ ∧ stable(s′) ∧ X ⊆
Act \ enabled(s′))} and refusals(U) = {X | ∃s ∈ U : X ∈ refusals(s)} for U ⊆ S.
This definition is ambiguous in the following sense. If s is required to be stable then
the only state s′ such that s  s′ holds is, by definition, s itself, rendering the existential
quantification over s′ redundant and yielding a definition equivalent to Definition 2.5. Other-
wise, if s is not required to be stable then this definition defines refusals for any state, and,
hence, the set refusals(U) defined by [WSS+12] subsumes the set refusals(U) when following
Definition 2.5.
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Formally, a state s diverges, denoted by the predicate div(s), if and only if there is an infinite
sequence of states s τ−→ s1 τ−→ s2 τ−→ · · · . For a set of states U , we write div(U), iff div(s) for
some state s ∈ U .
Definition 2.7. The divergences of a state s are defined as divergences(s) = {ρ σ ∈ Act∗ |
∃t ∈ S : (s ρ t ∧ div(t))}. We define divergences(L) = divergences(ι).
Observe that a divergence is any weak trace that has a prefix ρ which can reach a diverging
state. This is based on the assumption that divergences lead to chaos. In theories such as
CSP, in which divergences are considered chaotic, chaos obscures all information about the
behaviours involving a diverging state; we refer to this as obscuring post-divergences details.
Definition 2.8. The set of all stable failures of a state s is defined as failures(s) = {(ρ,X) ∈
Act∗ × P(Act) | ∃t ∈ S : (s ρ t ∧ stable(t) ∧X ∈ refusals(t))}. The set of failures with post-
divergences details obscured is defined as failures⊥(s) = failures(s)∪{(ρ,X) ∈ Act∗×P(Act) |
ρ ∈ divergences(s)}.
The three models of CSP building on the different powers of observation are the trace model,
the stable failures model and the failures-divergences model. The refinement relations, induced
by these models, are called trace refinement, stable failures refinement and failures-divergences
refinement respectively.
Definition 2.9. Let L1 and L2 be two LTSs.
• L1 is refined by L2 in trace semantics, denoted by L1 vtr L2, if and only if weaktraces(L2) ⊆
weaktraces(L1).
• L1 is refined by L2 in stable failures semantics, denoted by L1 vsfr L2, if and only if
failures(L2) ⊆ failures(L1) and weaktraces(L2) ⊆ weaktraces(L1).
• L1 is refined by L2 in failures-divergences semantics, denoted by L1 vfdr L2, if and only if
both failures⊥(L2) ⊆ failures⊥(L1) and divergences(L2) ⊆ divergences(L1).
The LTS that is typically refined is referred to as the specification, whereas the LTS that
refines the specification is referred to as the implementation.
Remark 2.10. As opposed to [WSS+12] we write the specification on the left and the
implementation on the right of the refinement relation as is common in other literature [BR84,
Ros10, vG17].
Remark 2.11. The notions defined above appear in different formulations in [WSS+12].
Their definition of stable failures refinement omits the clause for weak trace inclusion, and
their definition of failures-divergences refinement replaces failures⊥ with failures. This yields
refinement relations different from the standard ones and neither relation seems to appear
in the literature [vG19]. Additionally, the definition of failures in [WSS+12] drops the
requirement on the stability of state t and uses the alternative definition of refusals on
unstable states that was mentioned in Remark 2.6. However, this leads to provably equivalent
notions of failures.
We conclude with a small example, illustrating the uses of, and differences between the
various refinement relations.
Example 2.12. Consider the specification s0 of a simplified automated teller machine (ATM)
depicted below.
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s0 s1
s2s3
s5
req
τ
τ
20
10
10
t0 t1 t2
req 20
u0 u1 u2
req 20
τ
τ
In the specification on the left the user can first request, by action req, an amount of twenty
from the machine. The machine can then satisfy this request by either choosing to give
twenty directly or by presenting two times ten to the user, which might vary depending
on availability within the machine. Note that the distinction between user-initiated and
response actions is only for the sake of the explanation and is not formally present in the
LTS. An implementation of this specification is valid if and only if it refines the specification
in the required refinement semantics.
Let us consider t0 as a first implementation of this machine. According to trace semantics,
the (weak) traces of t0, consisting of the set {,req,req 20}, are included in the specification
and therefore s0 vtr t0. Trace refinement is suitable for safety properties, for example the
absence of infinite 10 or 20 actions without interleaving requests can be specified in such
semantics. However, the observation of the failure (req 20, {req, 20, 10}) of t0 when reaching
the deadlocked state t2, which is a state with no outgoing transitions, is not possible from s0.
Consequently, s0 6vsfr t0. Note that this shows that sensitivity to deadlocks is an important
aspect of stable failures refinement.
The second implementation that we consider is u0. The self-loop above state u1 might
indicate that the machine uses (repeated) polling via a potentially unstable connection to
determine whether the user’s bank account permits the requested withdrawal. Now, u1 is no
longer a stable state, but the remaining failures of the shape (req 20req 20 . . . , {10, 20})
are permitted observations for the given specification s0. Therefore, this implementation is
a valid stable failures refinement of the given specification, i.e., s0 vsfr u0. The resulting
divergence req ρ for sequences ρ ∈ Act∗ means that this implementation is, however, not
valid under failures-divergences refinement, i.e., s0 6vfdr u0. From the perspective of the
user, it is indeed questionable whether u0 constitutes a proper implementation, as she may
perceive a diverging run of the system as a deadlock.
3. Refinement Checking
In general, the set of (weak) traces, failures and divergences of an LTS can be infinite.
Therefore, checking inclusion of these sets directly is not viable. In [Ros94, Ros10], an
algorithm to decide refinement between two labelled transition systems is sketched. As a
preprocessing step to this algorithm, all diverging states in both LTSs are marked. The
algorithm then relies on exploring the cartesian product of the normal form representation
of the specification, i.e., the LTS that is to be refined, and the implementation.
Remark 3.1. What we refer to as cartesian product, defined in [Ros94], is called a synchro-
nous product in [WSS+12].
For each state in the product it checks whether it can locally decide non-refinement of the
implementation state with the normal form state. A state for which non-refinement holds is
referred to as a witness.
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Following [Ros10, WSS+12] and specifically the terminology of [Ros94], we formalise the
cartesian product between LTSs that is explored by the procedure.
Definition 3.2. Let Li = (Si, ιi,→i) where i ∈ {1, 2} be two LTSs. The cartesian product
of L1 and L2, denoted by L1 × L2, is an LTS L = (S , ι,→) such that S = S1 × S2 and
ι = (ι1, ι2). The transition relation → is the smallest relation such that for all s1, t1 ∈ S1,
and s2, t2 ∈ S2 and a ∈ Act :
• If s2 τ−→2 t2 then (s1, s2) τ−→ (s1, t2).
• If s1 a−→1 t1 and s2 a−→2 t2 then (s1, s2) a−→ (t1, t2).
We show several characteristic properties of this cartesian product. The following lemmas
are in the context of LTSs L1 = (S1, ι1,→1), L2 = (S2, ι2,→2) and their cartesian product
L = (S , ι,→) given by L1 × L2.
Lemma 3.3. For all states (s1, s2), (t1, t2) ∈ S there is a weak transition (s1, s2)  (t1, t2)
if and only if s1 = t1 and s2
 2 t2.
Proof. We prove the statement by induction on the length of the traces σ ∈ τ∗ underlying
(s1, s2)
 (t1, t2).
Base case. Take arbitrary states (s1, s2), (t1, t2) ∈ S . Then (s1, s2) −→ (t1, t2) iff
(s1, s2) = (t1, t2) by definition of −→ and, by definition, s2  2 s2.
Inductive step. Suppose that the statement holds for all sequences σ ∈ τ∗ of length
i. Take arbitrary states (s1, s2), (u1, u2) ∈ S such that (s1, s2) σ τ−−→ (u1, u2). By definition
there is a state (t1, t2) ∈ S such that (s1, s2) σ−→ (t1, t2) and (t1, t2) τ−→ (u1, u2). From the
induction hypothesis it then follows that s1 = t1 and s2
σ−→ 2 t2. Finally, by the existence of
(t1, t2)
τ−→ (u1, u2) it follows that t1 = u1 and t2 τ−→2 u2. It then also follows that s1 = u1 and
s2
 2 u2.
Lemma 3.4. For all states (s1, s2), (t1, t2) ∈ S and actions a ∈ Act it holds that (s1, s2) a 
(t1, t2) if and only if s1
a−→1 t1 and s2 a 2 t2.
Proof. Take arbitrary states (s1, s2), (t1, t2) ∈ S and action a ∈ Act .
=⇒ ) Assume that (s1, s2) a (t1, t2) holds. Then, by Lemma 3.3, there are states and
transitions (s1, s2)
 (s1, s′2), (s1, s′2)
a−→ (t1, t′2) and (t1, t′2)  (t1, t2) in the product and
transitions s2
 2 s′2 and t′2
 2 t2 in L2. From the definition of the cartesian product and
the existence of (s1, s′2)
a−→ (t1, t′2) there are transitions s1 a−→1 t1 and s′2 a−→2 t′2. Finally,
s2
a 2 t2 follows by definition.
⇐= ) Along the same lines.
A key property of the cartesian product is the generalisation of Lemma 3.4:
Proposition 3.5. For all states (s1, t1), (s2, t2) ∈ S and all sequences ρ ∈ Act∗ it holds that
(s1, s2)
ρ (t1, t2) if and only if s1
ρ−→ 1 t1 and s2 ρ 2 t2.
Proof. Proof by induction on the length of all sequences in Act∗.
Base case. Take arbitrary states (s1, t1), (s2, t2) ∈ S such that (s1, s2)  (t1, t2). By
Lemma 3.3, (s1, s2)
 (t1, t2) if and only if s1 = t1 and s2  2 t2. Finally, s1 −→ 1 s1 by
definition.
Inductive step. Suppose that the statement holds for all ρ ∈ Act∗ of length i.
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=⇒ ) Take arbitrary states (s1, u1), (s2, u2) ∈ S and action a ∈ Act such that (s1, s2) ρ a 
(u1, u2). Then there is a state (t1, t2) ∈ S such that (s1, s2) ρ (t1, t2) and (t1, t2) a (u1, u2).
From the induction hypothesis it follows that s1
ρ−→ 1 t1 and s2 ρ 2 t2. The existence of
t1
a−→1 u1 and t2 a 2 u2 follows from Lemma 3.4. We can thus conclude that s1 ρ a−→ 1 u1
and s2
ρ a 2 u2.
⇐= ) Similar.
The normal form LTS of a given LTS is obtained using a typical subset construction as is
common when determinising a transition system. A difference between determinisation and
normalisation is that the former yields a transition system that preserves and reflects the set
of weak traces of the given LTS. This is not the case for the latter, which may add weak
traces not present in the original LTS. We first introduce the normal form LTS of a given
LTS that is adequate for reducing the trace refinement and stable failures decision problems
to a reachability problem.
Definition 3.6. Let L = (S , ι,→) be an LTS. The normal form of L, denoted by norm(L),
is the LTS L′ = (S ′, ι′,→′) where S ′ = P(S ), ι′ = {s ∈ S | ι  s} and →′ is defined as
U
a−→′ V if and only if V = {t ∈ S | ∃s ∈ U : s a t} for all sets of states U, V ⊆ S and
actions a ∈ Act .
Notice that ∅ is a state in a normal form LTS. Clearly, ∅ a ′ ∅ for all actions a. Moreover,
note that a normal form LTS is deterministic and concrete; in particular, for all σ, and
states U, V,W of a normal form LTS U σ−→ ′ V and U σ−→ ′ W implies V =W , see Lemma 2.4.
Consequently, a trace leads to a unique state in the normal form LTS.
Since a normal form LTS is concrete, all of its states are stable. The states of the original
LTS comprising a normal form state may not be stable, however. When we need to reason
about the stability and refusals of the set of states U in the LTS L underlying a normal form
LTS, rather than the state U of the normal form LTS, we therefore write [[U ]]L whenever we
wish to stress that we refer to the set of states in L that comprise U .
Next, we establish several properties of the normalised LTS resulting from norm, relating
its behaviours to those of the original LTS. The following lemmas are in the context of an
LTS L = (S , ι,→) and the normalised LTS L′ = (S ′, ι′,→′) resulting from norm(L).
Lemma 3.7. For all sequences ρ ∈ Act∗ and states U ∈ S ′ such that ι′ ρ−→ ′ U it holds that
ι
ρ s for all s ∈ [[U ]]L.
Proof. We use induction on the length of all sequences in Act∗ to prove the statement.
Base case. First, ι′ −→ ′ U iff U = ι′ by definition. The state ι′ is equal to {s | ι  s} as
defined in the normalisation. Hence, for every state s ∈ [[ι′ ]]L we have ι  s.
Inductive case. Suppose that the statement holds for all sequences ρ ∈ Act∗ of length i.
Take an arbitrary state V ∈ S ′ and action a ∈ Act such that ι′ ρ a−→ ′ V . Then there is a state
U ∈ S ′ such that ι′ ρ−→ ′ U and U a−→′ V . By definition of normalisation there is a transition
U
a−→′ V if and only if V = {t ∈ S | ∃s ∈ U : s a t}. So for all states t ∈ [[V ]]L there is a
state s ∈ [[U ]]L such that s a t. By the induction hypothesis it holds that for all s ∈ [[U ]]L
there is a weak transition ι
ρ s. But then we may conclude that ι ρ a t for all t ∈ [[V ]]L.
Lemma 3.8. For all sequences ρ ∈ Act∗ and for all states s ∈ S such that ι ρ s there is a
state U ∈ S ′ such that s ∈ [[U ]]L and ι′ ρ−→ ′ U .
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Proof. We proceed using an induction on the length of all sequences in Act∗.
Base case. Let s ∈ S and suppose ι  s. Then s ∈ [[ι′ ]]L, since ι′ is defined as
{s ∈ S | ι  s}. Moreover, we trivially have ι′ −→ ′ ι′.
Inductive step. Suppose that the statement holds for sequences ρ ∈ Act∗ of length i.
Take an arbitrary state t ∈ S and action a ∈ Act such that ι ρ a t. Then there is a state
s ∈ S such that ι ρ s and s a t. Fix such a state s ∈ S . From the induction hypothesis
it then follows that there is a state U ∈ S ′ such that s ∈ [[U ]]L and ι′ ρ−→ ′ U . Fix this state
U ∈ S ′. Let V be equal to {t ∈ S | ∃u ∈ U : u a t}; then by definition, U a−→′ V . It follows
that ι′ ρ a−→ ′ V . Finally, t ∈ [[V ]]L follows from s a t and s ∈ [[U ]]L.
Lemma 3.9. For all sequences ρ ∈ Act∗ it holds that ρ /∈ weaktraces(L) if and only if
ι′ ρ−→ ′ ∅.
Proof.
=⇒ ) We use induction on the length of the sequences ρ ∈ Act∗.
Base case. The implication holds vacuously since  ∈ weaktraces(L).
Inductive step. Suppose that the implication holds for all sequences ρ ∈ Act∗ of
length i. Assume an arbitrary action a ∈ Act such that ρ a /∈ weaktraces(L). From
ρ a /∈ weaktraces(L) it follows that there is no state t ∈ S such that ι ρ a t. We distinguish
two cases:
– Case ρ /∈ weaktraces(L). From the induction hypothesis we obtain ι′ ρ−→ ′ ∅ and ∅ a−→′ ∅
by definition. We may therefore also conclude ι′ ρ a−→ ′ ∅.
– Case ρ ∈ weaktraces(L). Then there is a state s ∈ S such that ι ρ s. Since L′ is
deterministic there is a unique state U ∈ S ′ such that both s ∈ [[U ]]L and ι′ ρ−→ ′ U
by Lemmas 3.8 and 2.4. For all states u ∈ S satisfying ι ρ u (which exist as ρ ∈
weaktraces(L)) there cannot be a state t ∈ S such that u a t by the observation that
ρ a /∈ weaktraces(L). Therefore, U a−→′ ∅ and thus also ι′ ρ a−→ ′ ∅.
⇐= ) Suppose ι′ ρ−→ ′ ∅. Towards a contradiction, assume that ρ ∈ weaktraces(L). Then
there is a state s ∈ S such that ι ρ s. By Lemma 3.9, there must be some U ∈ S ′ such
that s ∈ [[U ]]L and ι′ ρ−→ ′ U . Since L′ is deterministic, by Lemma 2.4, we obtain that this
state U must be such that U = ∅.
The structure explored by the refinement checking procedure of [Ros94, Ros10] for two LTSs
L1 and L2 is the cartesian product norm(L1) × L2 in case of trace refinement and stable
failures refinement. For these structures the related witnesses, where the reachability of such
a witness indicates non-refinement, are then as follows:
Definition 3.10. Let L1 and L2 be LTSs. A state (U, s) of the product norm(L1)× L2:
• is called a TR-witness if and only if U = ∅.
• is called an SF-witness if and only if at least one of the following conditions hold:
– U = ∅.
– stable(s) and refusals(s) 6⊆ refusals([[U ]]L1).
The theorem we provide below states that trace refinement can be decided by deciding
reachability of a TR-witness in the product norm(L1) × L2; this follows directly from
Lemma 3.9.
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Theorem 3.11. Let L1 and L2 be two LTSs. Then L1 vtr L2 holds if and only if there is
no TR-witness reachable in norm(L1)× L2.
For stable failures refinement the relationship between an SF-witness and the corresponding
refinement relation was already established in [Ros94]. However, the definitions in that paper
are not explicit and the proof of this relation is only sketched. Therefore, we provide a
detailed proof of the following theorem:
Theorem 3.12. Let L1 = (S1, ι1,→1) and L2 = (S2, ι2,→2) be two LTSs. Then L1 vsfr L2
holds if and only if there is no SF-witness reachable in norm(L1)× L2.
Proof. Let L = (S , ι,→) be equal to norm(L1)× L2.
=⇒ ) Suppose that L1 vsfr L2 holds. Therefore, failures(L2) ⊆ failures(L1) and
weaktraces(L2) ⊆ weaktraces(L1). Now assume that there is a reachable SF-witness
(U, s) in norm(L1)× L2. We show that this leads to a contradiction. As the pair (U, s) is
reachable there is a weak trace ρ ∈ weaktraces(norm(L1)×L2) such that ι ρ (U, s). From
Proposition 3.5 it follows that ι2
ρ 2 s and U is reachable by following ρ in norm(L1). For
(U, s) to be an SF-witness there are two cases:
– Case U = ∅. By Lemma 3.9 it holds that the weak trace ρ ending in the empty set is
not a weak trace of L1, i.e., ρ /∈ weaktraces(L1). This contradicts the assumption that
weaktraces(L2) ⊆ weaktraces(L1).
– Case U 6= ∅, stable(s) and refusals(s) 6⊆ refusals([[U ]]L1). Pick a failure (ρ,X) ∈
failures(L2) where s can stably refuse X ∈ refusals(s), but X /∈ refusals([[U ]]L1). By
Lemma 2.4 the state U that can be reached by following weak trace ρ is unique. So,
(ρ,X) /∈ failures(L1), which contradicts failures(L2) ⊆ failures(L1).
We conclude that the state (U, s) cannot be an SF-witness.
⇐= ) No SF-witness is reachable in norm(L1)×L2. Again, we prove this by contradiction.
Assume that L1 6vsfr L2. By definition of the stable failures refinement this means that
failures(L2) 6⊆ failures(L1) or weaktraces(L2) 6⊆ weaktraces(L1). Now, there are two cases
to consider.
– Case weaktraces(L2) 6⊆ weaktraces(L1). Pick a weak trace ρ ∈ weaktraces(L2) such that
ρ /∈ weaktraces(L1). So, there is a state s ∈ S2 such that ι2 ρ 2 s. By Lemma 3.9 it
holds that ρ leads to the empty set in norm(L1). By Proposition 3.5 the pair (∅, s) is a
reachable SF-witness by definition. Contradiction.
– Case failures(L2) 6⊆ failures(L1). Pick a failure (ρ,X) ∈ failures(L2) such that (ρ,X) /∈
failures(L1). There is a stable state s ∈ S2 such that ι2 ρ 2 s and X ∈ refusals(s) by
definition of a failure. We make a further case distinction.
∗ Case ρ /∈ weaktraces(L1). Then weaktraces(L2) 6⊆ weaktraces(L1) by definition of
failure, which, as we have already seen, leads to a contradiction.
∗ Case ρ ∈ weaktraces(L1). Failure (ρ,X) /∈ failures(L1) by assumption. By Lemmas 2.4
and 3.8 weak trace ρ leads to a unique state U in norm(L1) such that for all states t ∈ S2
with ι1
ρ 1 t it holds that t ∈ [[U ]]L1 . For each stable t it holds that X /∈ refusals(t) by
definition of a failure. Therefore, by Lemma 3.7 it follows that X /∈ refusals([[U ]]L1).
Hence, refusals(s) 6⊆ refusals([[U ]]L1). By Proposition 3.5 the pair (U, s) is reachable
and it is an SF-witness by definition. Contradiction.
We can thus conclude that L1 vsfr L2.
The example below illustrates the ramifications of Theorem 3.12.
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Example 3.13. Reconsider the specification s0 of the ATM of Example 2.12. The (reachable
part of the) normal form LTS of s0 is depicted below (left); the (reachable part of the) normal
form LTS of u0 is depicted below (right).
{s0}
{s3}
{s1, s2, s5}∅
req
10
20
10
10, 20 req
20,req
10, 20,req {u0} {u1} {u0, u2}
∅
req
20
req
10, 20
10,req
10, 20
10, 20,req
First, notice that the normal form LTS of s0 is deterministic and universal (each state has an
outgoing transition for each action). Now consider the implementation t0 of Example 2.12.
In the cartesian product norm(s0)× t0, the state ({s0}, t2) is reachable and an SF-witness
since stable(t2) and {10, 20,req} ∈ refusals(t2) but {10, 20,req} /∈ refusals({s0}). By
Theorem 3.12, we may therefore indeed conclude that s0 6vsfr t0. Similarly, we can conclude
that u0 6vsfr t0 since the SF-witness ({u0, u2}, t2) is reachable.
One may be inclined to believe that the normal form LTS can also be used to reduce the
failures-divergences refinement decision problem to a reachability problem. This is, however,
not the case as the following example illustrates.
Example 3.14. Reconsider the LTSs t0 and u0 of Example 2.12. Note that t0 is a correct
failures-divergences refinement of u0. This is mainly because past the divergence req that is
specified in u0, any behaviour is permitted. In turn, this suggests that in the reachability
analysis of the product, states beyond a divergence should not be considered as candidate
witnesses. The reachability of the pair ({u0, u2}, t2) in the cartesian product norm(u0)× t0,
is thus problematic, as the pair indicates a violation of both u0 vfdr t2 and u2 vfdr t2.
Our solution is to modify the construction of the normal form LTS for failures-divergences
refinement as follows.
Definition 3.15. Let L = (S , ι,→) be an LTS. The failures-divergences normal form of L,
denoted by normfdr(L), is the LTS L′ = (S ′, ι′,→′) where S ′ = P(S ), ι′ = {s ∈ S | ι  s} and
→′ is defined as U a−→′ V if and only if ¬(∃s ∈ U : div(s)) and V = {t ∈ S | ∃s ∈ U : s a t}
for all sets of states U, V ⊆ S and actions a ∈ Act .
Notice that normfdr(L) yields a subgraph of norm(L). As a result, several properties that
we established for norm carry over to normfdr. For instance, normfdr yields LTSs that are
deterministic and concrete. However, contrary to LTSs obtained via norm, LTSs obtained via
normfdr are not guaranteed to be universal (i.e., not necessarily traces(normfdr(L)) = Act∗).
In particular, a divergence ρ ∈ weaktraces(L) is not guaranteed to be preserved in normfdr(L).
Consequently, Lemma 3.9, which is essential for Theorems 3.11 and 3.12, no longer holds
in its full generality. We show, however, that for failures-divergence refinement a slightly
different relation between an LTS and its normal form is sufficient for establishing a theorem
that is similar in spirit to the aforementioned theorems.
The following lemmas are in the context of an LTS L = (S , ι,→) and the normalised
LTS L′ = (S ′, ι′,→′) resulting from normfdr(L).
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Lemma 3.16. For all sequences ρ ∈ Act∗ and states U ∈ S ′ such that ι′ ρ−→ ′ U it holds that
ι
ρ s for all s ∈ [[U ]]L.
Proof. Along the same lines as the proof of Lemma 3.7.
We mentioned that divergences are not necessarily preserved (as traces) by the normalisation.
In fact, we can be more specific: only minimal divergences are preserved in the normal
form LTS. The minimal divergences of a state s ∈ S , denoted by divergencesmin(s), is the
largest subset of divergences(s) containing all ρ ∈ divergencesmin(s) for which there is no
strict prefix of ρ in divergences(s). For an LTS L = (S , ι,→) we define divergencesmin(L) to
be divergencesmin(ι).
Lemma 3.17. For all sequences ρ ∈ Act∗ such that either ρ /∈ divergences(L) or ρ ∈
divergencesmin(L) and for all states s ∈ S such that ι
ρ s there is a state U ∈ S ′ such that
s ∈ [[U ]]L and ι′ ρ−→ ′ U .
Proof. Proof by induction on the length of all sequences that are not divergences or minimal
divergences.
Base case. The empty trace  satisfies  /∈ divergences(L) or  ∈ divergencesmin(L) by
definition. Hence, we must show that for all states s ∈ S satisfying ι  s there is a state
U ∈ S ′ such that s ∈ [[U ]]L and ι′ −→ ′ U . We know that if ι  s then s ∈ [[ι′ ]]L, because ι′ is
defined as {s ∈ S | ι  s} in the normalisation. Finally, we also know that ι′ −→ ′ ι′.
Inductive step. Suppose that the statement holds for sequences ρ ∈ Act∗ of length i that
are either not divergences or minimal divergences of L. Take an arbitrary state t ∈ S and
action a ∈ Act such that ι ρ a t and ρ a /∈ divergences(L) or ρ a ∈ divergencesmin(L). Note
that whenever ρ a /∈ divergences(L) or ρ a ∈ divergencesmin(L) then ρ /∈ divergences(L). From
ι
ρ a t it follows that there is a state s ∈ S such that ι ρ s and s a t. By our induction
hypothesis it then follows that there is a state U ∈ S ′ such that s ∈ [[U ]]L and ι′ ρ−→ ′ U . For
all states u ∈ [[U ]]L it holds that ι ρ u by Lemma 3.16, so by definition of divergences it
must be that ¬div(u) and hence ¬div([[U ]]L). Let V be equal to {v ∈ S | ∃u ∈ U : u a v}
such that U a−→′ V by definition of the normalisation. It follows that ι′ ρ a−→ ′ V . Finally,
t ∈ [[V ]]L follows from s a t and s ∈ [[U ]]L.
Lemma 3.18. For all sequences ρ ∈ Act∗ and states U ∈ S ′ it holds that if ι′ ρ−→ ′ U and
¬div([[U ]]L) then ρ /∈ divergences(L).
Proof. Let ρ ∈ Act∗ and U ∈ S ′ be such that ι′ ρ−→ ′ U and ¬div([[U ]]L). Towards a
contradiction, assume that ρ ∈ divergences(L). We distinguish two cases:
• ρ ∈ divergencesmin(L). Let t ∈ S be such that ι
ρ t and div(t). Note that due to the
determinism of normfdr(L) and Lemma 3.17, for all s ∈ S such that ι ρ s, we have s ∈ U .
Hence also t ∈ U . But div(t) then implies div([[U ]]L). Contradiction.
• ρ /∈ divergencesmin(L). Then ρ = ρ′ρ′′ for some ρ′ ∈ divergencesmin(L). Let t ∈ S be
such that ι
ρ′ t and div(t). Then, by Lemma 3.17, there must be some V ∈ S ′ such
that ι′ ρ
′
−→ ′ V and t ∈ V . Let V be such. Since div(t) and t ∈ V , V has no outgoing
transitions in normfdr(L). In particular, we cannot have V ρ
′′
−→ ′ U , and because normfdr(L)
is deterministic, we also cannot have ι′ ρ−→ ′ U . Contradiction.
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Lemma 3.19. For all sequences ρ ∈ Act∗ it holds that ρ /∈ (divergences(L) ∪ weaktraces(L))
if and only if ι′ ρ−→ ′ ∅.
Proof.
=⇒ ) Proof by induction on the length of all sequences in ρ ∈ Act∗.
Base case. The implication holds vacuously since  ∈ weaktraces(L).
Inductive step. Suppose that the statement holds for all sequences ρ ∈ Act∗ of length
i. Take an arbitrary action a ∈ Act such that ρ a /∈ (divergences(L) ∪ weaktraces(L)).
From ρ a /∈ weaktraces(L) it follows that there is no state t ∈ S such that ι ρ a t. From
ρ a /∈ divergences(L) it follows that ρ /∈ divergences(L). Now, there are two cases to
distinguish:
– Case ρ /∈ weaktraces(L). From the induction hypothesis we obtain ι′ ρ−→ ′ ∅ and ∅ a−→′ ∅
by definition. Thus ι′ ρ a−→ ′ ∅.
– Case ρ ∈ weaktraces(L). There is a state s ∈ S such that ι ρ s. Since L′ is deterministic
there is a unique state U ∈ S ′ such that s ∈ [[U ]]L and ι′ ρ−→ ′ U by Lemma 3.17 and 2.4.
We may furthermore conclude that ¬div[[U ]]L. Because ρ a /∈ weaktraces(L), no state
u ∈ S for which ι ρ u satisfies u a t, for any state t. Therefore, by definition, U a−→′ ∅,
and thus ι′ ρ a−→ ′ ∅.
⇐= ) Suppose ι′ ρ−→ ′ ∅. From the observation that ¬div(∅) and Lemma 3.18 it follows that
ρ /∈ divergences(L). Towards a contradiction, assume that ρ ∈ weaktraces(L). Then there
is a state s ∈ S such that ι ρ s. By Lemma 3.19, there must be some U ∈ S ′ such that
s ∈ [[U ]]L and ι′ ρ−→ ′ U . Since L′ is deterministic, by Lemma 2.4, we obtain that this state
U must be such that U = ∅. Contradiction.
For failures-divergences refinement the state space of normfdr(L1) × L2 is explored for a
witness, where reachability also indicates non-refinement, that is defined as follows:
Definition 3.20. Let L1 and L2 be LTSs. A state (U, s) of the product normfdr(L1)×L2 is
called an FD-witness if and only if ¬div([[U ]]L1) and at least one of the following conditions
hold:
• U = ∅.
• stable(s) and refusals(s) 6⊆ refusals([[U ]]L1).
• div(s).
Theorem 3.21. Let L1 = (S1, ι1,→1) and L2 = (S2, ι2,→2) be two LTSs. Then L1 vfdr L2
holds if and only if there is no FD-witness reachable in normfdr(L1)× L2.
Proof. Let L = (S , ι,→) be equal to normfdr(L1)× L2.
=⇒ ). Assume that L1 vfdr L2. We then have failures⊥(L2) ⊆ failures⊥(L1) and
divergences(L2) ⊆ divergences(L1). Towards a contradiction, assume there is an FD-
witness (U, s) in reachable(normfdr(L1) × L2). Let ρ ∈ weaktraces(normfdr(L1) × L2) be
such that ι
ρ (U, s). From the assumption that (U, s) is an FD-witness it follows that
¬div([[U ]]L1) and from Lemma 3.18 it follows that ρ /∈ divergences(L1). By Proposition 3.5
it holds that ι2
ρ 2 s and U is reachable by following ρ in normfdr(L1). For (U, s) to be an
FD-witness there are three cases:
– Case U = ∅ ∧ ¬div(s). From ¬div(s) it follows that there is a state t ∈ S2 such that
ι2
ρ 2 s  2 t and stable(t). Let t be such. Consequently, (ρ,X) ∈ failures⊥(L2) for
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some X ∈ refusals(t). By Lemma 3.19 it holds that the weak trace ρ reaching the
empty set in normfdr(L1) is not a weak trace of L1. Together with ρ /∈ divergences(L1)
it follows, for all possible refusal sets X ⊆ Act , that (ρ,X) /∈ failures⊥(L1) which leads
to a contradiction with the assumption that failures⊥(L2) ⊆ failures⊥(L1).
– Case U 6= ∅∧stable(s)∧refusals(s) 6⊆ refusals([[U ]]L1). Pick a failure (ρ,X) ∈ failures⊥(L2)
where s can stably refuse X ∈ refusals(s), but X /∈ refusals([[U ]]L1). By Lemma 2.4
the state U that can be reached by following weak trace ρ is unique. Together with
ρ /∈ divergences(L1) follows that (ρ,X) /∈ failures⊥(L1), which leads to a contradiction
with the assumption that failures⊥(L2) ⊆ failures⊥(L1).
– Case div(s). We know that ρ ∈ divergences(L2) by definition of divergences. How-
ever, by ρ /∈ divergences(L1) this leads to a contradiction with the assumption that
divergences(L2) ⊆ divergences(L1).
⇐= ) Assume that no FD-witness is reachable in normfdr(L1)× L2. Again, we prove this
by contradiction. Assume that L1 6vfdr L2. By definition of failures-divergences refinement
this means that failures⊥(L2) 6⊆ failures⊥(L1) or divergences(L2) 6⊆ divergences(L1). Now,
there are two cases to consider:
– Case failures⊥(L2) 6⊆ failures⊥(L1) and divergences(L2) ⊆ divergences(L1). Pick any
failure (ρ,X) ∈ failures⊥(L2) such that (ρ,X) /∈ failures⊥(L1). Observe that ρ /∈
divergences(L1) (and as such ρ /∈ divergences(L2)) as otherwise no such (ρ,X) exists by
the post-divergences details obscurance of failures⊥(L1). There is a stable state s ∈ S2
such that ι2
ρ 2 s and X ∈ refusals(s) by definition of a failure. There are two cases for
the weak trace ρ to distinguish:
∗ Case ρ /∈ weaktraces(L1). By Lemma 3.19 this means that ρ is a trace leading to the
empty set in normfdr(L1). By Proposition 3.5 there is a pair (∅, s) such that ι ρ (∅, s)
and that pair is a reachable FD-witness by definition. Contradiction.
∗ Case ρ ∈ weaktraces(L1). Failure (ρ,X) /∈ failures⊥(L1) by assumption. By Lem-
mas 2.4 and 3.17 there is a unique state V of normfdr(L1) reachable via weak trace ρ
such that for all t ∈ S1 where ι1 ρ 1 t holds that t ∈ [[V ]]L1 . Thus X /∈ refusals(t), for
stable t, by definition of a failure and X /∈ refusals([[V ]]L1) by Lemma 3.16. Therefore
refusals(s) 6⊆ refusals([[V ]]L1). By Proposition 3.5 the pair (V, s) is reachable and it is
an FD-witness by definition. Contradiction.
– Case divergences(L2) 6⊆ divergences(L1). Pick a diverging weak trace ρ ∈ divergences(L2)
such that ρ /∈ divergences(L1). In this case there is a prefix of ρ, which we call σ, that
leads to a diverging state s ∈ S2 such that ι2 σ 2 s. However, by the assumption
that ρ /∈ divergences(L1) we know that all states t ∈ S1 reached by following σ are not
diverging. Again, by Lemma 2.4 and 3.17 the weak trace σ in L1 reaches a unique state
U of normfdr(L1). Therefore state pair (U, s) is an FD-witness, because div(s) but not
div([[U ]]L1). Contradiction.
Example 3.22. Consider the LTSs t0 and u0 of Example 2.12 once more. As we noted
in Example 3.14, t0 is a correct failures-divergences refinement of u0. Note that the pair
({u0, u2}, t2), which was reachable in the cartesian product norm(u0) × t0, is no longer
reachable in the cartesian product normfdr(u0)× t0. In fact, no FD-witness is reachable in
the latter cartesian product, thus confirming that indeed u0 vfdr t0.
CORRECT AND EFFICIENT ANTICHAIN ALGORITHMS FOR REFINEMENT CHECKING 15
4. Antichain Algorithms for Refinement Checking
Notice that Theorems 3.11, 3.12 and 3.21 provide the basis for straightforward algorithms for
deciding trace refinement, stable failures refinement and failures-divergences refinement: one
can explore the cartesian product of the normalised specification and the impementation,
looking for a witness on-the-fly. In these algorithms, the normalisation of the specification
LTS dominates the theoretical worst-case run time complexity of the algorithms. While
refinement checking itself is a PSPACE-hard problem, in practice, the problem can often be
solved quite effectively. Nevertheless, as observed in [WSS+12], antichains provide room for
improvement by potentially reducing the number of states of the normal form LTS of the
specification that must be checked.
An antichain is a set A ⊆ X of a partially ordered set (X,≤) in which all distinct
x, y ∈ A are incomparable: neither x ≤ y nor y ≤ x. Given a partially ordered set (X,≤)
and an antichain A, the membership test, denoted by b, checks whether A ‘contains’ an
element x; that is, x b A holds true if and only if there is some y ∈ A such that y ≤ x. We
write Y b∀ A iff y b A for all y ∈ Y . Antichain A can be extended by inserting an element
x ∈ X, denoted A uniondbl x, which is defined as the set {y | y = x ∨ (y ∈ A ∧ x 6≤ y)}. Note that
this operation only yields an antichain whenever x 6b A.
As [WSS+12, ACH+10] suggest, the state space of the cartesian product (S , ι,→) between
a normal form of LTS L1 and the LTS L2 induces a partially ordered set as follows. For
(U, s), (V, t) ∈ S , define (U, s) ≤ (V, t) iff s = t and [[U ]]L1 ⊆ [[V ]]L1 . Then the set (S,≤) is a
partially ordered set. The fundamental property underlying the reason why an antichain
approach to refinement checking works is expressed by the following claim (which we repeat
as Proposition 5.8, and prove in Section 5), stating that the traces of any state (V, s) in
the cartesian product can be executed from all states smaller than (V, s). Notice that this
property relies on the fact that the empty set is included as a state in the normal form LTS.
Claim 4.1. For all states (U, s), (V, s) of normfdr(L1) × L2 satisfying (U, s) ≤ (V, s) and
for every sequence σ ∈ Actτ ∗ such that (V, s) σ−→ (V ′, t) there is a state (U ′, t) such that
(U, s)
σ−→ (U ′, t) and (U ′, t) ≤ (V ′, t).
The main idea of the antichain algorithms is now as follows: the set of states of the cartesian
product that have been explored are recorded in an antichain rather than a set. Whenever a
new state of the cartesian product is found that is already included in the antichain (w.r.t. the
membership test b), further exploration of that state is unnecessary, thereby pruning the
state space of the cartesian product. While the proposition stated above suggests this is
sound for trace refinement, it is not immediate that doing so is also sound for refusals and
divergences.
Based on the above informal reasoning, [WSS+12] presents antichain algorithms that
intend to check for trace refinement, stable failures refinement and failures-divergences
refinement. Before we discuss these algorithms in more detail, see Algorithms 1-3, we here
present their pseudocode for the sake of completeness; in the remainder of this paper, we
refer to these as the original algorithms.
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Algorithm 1 Antichain-based trace refinement algorithm presented in [WSS+12]. The
algorithm returns true if and only if L1 = (S1, ι1,→1) is refined by L2 = (S2, ι2,→2) in trace
semantics.
1: procedure refines-trace(L1,L2)
2: let working be a stack containing a pair ({s ∈ S1 | ι1  1 s}, ι2)
3: let antichain := ∅
4: while working 6= ∅ do
5: pop (spec, impl) from working
6: antichain := antichain uniondbl (spec, impl)
7: for impl a−→2 impl ′ do
8: if a = τ then
9: spec′ := spec
10: else
11: spec′ := {s′ ∈ S1 | ∃s ∈ spec : s a 1 s′}
12: if spec′ = ∅ then
13: return false
14: if (spec′, impl ′) 6b antichain then
15: push (spec′, impl ′) into working
16: return true
Algorithm 2 Antichain-based stable failures refinement algorithm presented in [WSS+12].
The algorithm returns true if and only if L1 = (S1, ι1,→1) is refined by L2 = (S2, ι2,→2) in
stable failures semantics.
1: procedure refines-stable-failures(L1,L2)
2: let working be a stack containing a pair ({s ∈ S1 | ι1  1 s}, ι2)
3: let antichain := ∅
4: while working 6= ∅ do
5: pop (spec, impl) from working
6: antichain := antichain uniondbl (spec, impl)
7: if refusals(impl) 6⊆ refusals(spec) then
8: return false
9: for impl a−→2 impl ′ do
10: if a = τ then
11: spec′ := spec
12: else
13: spec′ := {s′ ∈ S1 | ∃s ∈ spec : s a 1 s′}
14: if spec′ = ∅ then
15: return false
16: if (spec′, impl ′) 6b antichain then
17: push (spec′, impl ′) into working
18: return true
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Algorithm 3 Antichain-based failures-divergences refinement algorithm presented
in [WSS+12]. The algorithm is claimed to return true iff L1 = (S1, ι1,→1) is refined
by L2 = (S2, ι2,→2) in failures-divergences semantics.
1: procedure refines-failures-divergences(L1,L2)
2: let working be a stack containing a pair ({s ∈ S1 | ι1  1 s}, ι2)
3: let antichain := ∅
4: while working 6= ∅ do
5: pop (spec, impl) from working
6: antichain := antichain uniondbl (spec, impl)
7: if div(impl) then
8: if ¬div(spec) then
9: return false
10: else
11: if refusals(impl) 6⊆ refusals(spec) then
12: return false
13: for impl a−→2 impl ′ do
14: if a = τ then
15: spec′ := spec
16: else
17: spec′ := {s′ ∈ S1 | ∃s ∈ spec : s a 1 s′}
18: if spec′ = ∅ then
19: return false
20: if (spec′, impl ′) 6b antichain then
21: push (spec′, impl ′) into working
22: return true
Let us stress that Algorithm 1 correctly decides trace refinement and Algorithm 2 correctly
decides stable failures refinement. However, Algorithm 3 fails to correctly decide failures-
divergences refinement. Moreover, Algorithms 2 and 3 fail to decide the non-standard
relations used in [WSS+12], see also the discussion in Remark 2.11. All three issues are
illustrated by the example below.
Example 4.2. Consider the four transition systems depicted below.
s0 s1 s2 t2 s3 t3
τ
a b
τ
a
a
τ
a
Let us first observe that the algorithm correctly decides that s1 vsfr s0 does not hold, which
follows from a violation of weaktraces(s0) ⊆ weaktraces(s1). Next, observe that we have
s0 vfdr s1, since the divergence of the root state s0 implies chaotic behaviour of s0 and,
hence, any system refines such a system. It is not hard to see, however, that Algorithm 3
returns false, wrongly concluding that s0 6vfdr s1.
With respect to the non-standard refinement relations defined in [WSS+12], we observe
the following. Since s0 is not stable, we have failures(s0) = ∅ and hence failures(s0) ⊆
failures(s1). Consequently, stable failures refinement as defined in [WSS+12] should hold, but
as we already concluded above, the algorithm returns false when checking for s1 vsfr s0. Next,
observe that the algorithm returns true when checking for s2 vfdr s3. The reason is that for
the pair ({s2}, s3), it detects that state s3 diverges and concludes that since also the normal
form state of the specification {s2} diverges, it can terminate the iteration and return true.
This is a consequence of splitting the divergence tests over two if -statements in lines 7 and 8.
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According to the failures-divergences refinement of [WSS+12], however, the algorithm should
return false, since failures(s3) ⊆ failures(s2) fails to hold: we have (a, {a}) ∈ failures(s3) but
not (a, {a}) ∈ failures(s2).
Notice that each algorithm explores the cartesian product between the normal form of a
specification, and an implementation in a depth-first, on-the-fly manner. While depth-first
search is typically used for detecting divergences, [Ros94] states a number of reasons for
running a refinement check in a breadth-first manner. Indeed, a compelling argument in
favour of using a breadth-first search is conciseness of the counterexample in case of a
non-refinement.
Each algorithm can be made to run in a breadth-first fashion simply by using a FIFO
queue rather than a stack as the data structure for working . However, our implementations
of these algorithms suffer from severely degraded performance. The performance degradation
can be traced back to the following three additional problems in the original algorithms, which
also are present (albeit less pronounced in practice) when utilising a depth-first exploration:
(1) The refusal check on line 7 of Algorithm 2 (and line 11 of Algorithm 3) is also performed
for unstable states, which, combined with the definition of refusals in [WSS+12] (see also
Remark 2.6), results in a repeated, potentially expensive, search for stable states;
(2) In all three algorithms, duplicate pairs might be added to working since working is filled
with all successors of (spec, impl) that fail the antichain membership test, regardless of
whether these pairs are already scheduled for exploration, i.e., included in working , or
not;
(3) In all three algorithms, contrary to the explicit claim in [WSS+12, Section 2.2] the
variable antichain is not guaranteed to be an antichain.
The first problem is readily seen to lead to undesirable overhead. The second and third
problem are more subtle. We first illustrate the second problem on Algorithm 1: the following
pathological example shows that the algorithm stores an excessive number of pairs in working .
Note that the two other algorithms suffer from the same phenomenon.
Example 4.3. Consider the family of LTSs Lkn = (Sn, ιn,→n) with states Sn = {s1, . . . , sn},
transitions si
aj−→n si−1 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k, 1 < i ≤ n and ιn = sn; see also the transition system
depicted below. Note that each LTS that belongs to this family is completely deterministic
and concrete.
sn sn−1 . . . s2 s1
ak
...
a1
ak
...
a1
ak
...
a1
Each labelled transition system in this class has n states and k · (n− 1) transitions. Suppose
one checks for trace refinement between an implementation and specification both of which
are given by Lkn; i.e., we test for Lkn vtr Lkn.
Using a depth-first search, Algorithm 1 will add the state reachable via a single step once
for every action, because ({si+1}, si+1) is only added to antichain after ({si}, si) has finished
exploring its outgoing transitions. This occurs in every state, because the state reached
via such a transition was not visited before. Hence, working contains exactly i · (k − 1) + 1
pairs at the end of the i-th iteration, resulting in a maximum working stack size of O(n · k)
entries. At the end of the n-th iteration antichain contains all reachable pairs of the cartesian
product, i.e., antichain is equal to ({si}, si) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Emptying working after
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the n-th iteration involves k antichain membership tests per entry. Consequently, O(n · k2)
antichain membership tests are required to check Lkn vtr Lkn.
The breadth-first variant of Algorithm 1 also adds the state reachable via a single
step once for every action for the same reason as the depth-first variant. However, now
({si+1}, si+1) is only added to the antichain after all k copies of ({si}, si) are taken from the
FIFO queue working . Therefore each entry in working adds k elements before it is added
to antichain, resulting in a maximum queue size of O(kn) at state ({s1}, s1). Emptying
working results in O(kn+1) antichain membership tests.
Finally, the example below illustrates the third problem of the algorithms, viz., the violation
of the antichain property. We again illustrate the problem on the most basic of all three
algorithms, viz., Algorithm 1.
Example 4.4. Consider the two left-most labelled transition systems depicted below, along
with the (normal form) cartesian product (the LTS on the right).
t0
t1 t2
a
b b
s0
s1
a b
({t0}, s0)
({t1}, s1) ({t1, t2}, s1)
a b
Algorithm 1 starts with working containing pair ({t0}, s0) and antichain = ∅. Inside the loop,
the pair ({t0}, s0) is popped from working and added to antichain. The successors of the pair
({t0}, s0) are the pairs ({t1}, s1) and ({t1, t2}, s1). Since antichain contains neither of these,
both successors are added to working in line 15. Next, popping ({t1}, s1) from working and
adding this pair to antichain results in antichain consisting of the set {({t0}, s0), ({t1}, s1)}.
In the final iteration of the algorithm, the pair ({t1, t2}, s1) is popped from working and
added to antichain, resulting in the set {({t0}, s0), ({t1}, s1), ({t1, t2}, s1)}. Clearly, since
({t1}, s1) ≤ ({t1, t2}, s1), the set antichain no longer is a proper antichain.
5. Correct and Improved Antichain Algorithms
We first focus on solving the performance problems of Algorithms 1 and 2. Subsequently, we
discuss the additional modifications that are required for Algorithm 3 to correctly decide
failures-divergences refinement.
The first performance problem that we identified, viz., the computational overhead
induced by checking for refusal inclusion in non-stable states (which does not occur when
checking for a TR-witness), can be solved in a rather straightforward manner: we only
perform the check to compare the refusals of the implementation and the normal form state
of the specification in case the implementation state is stable. Doing so avoids a potentially
expensive search for stable states.
The second and third performance problems we identified can be solved by rearranging
the computations that are conducted; these modifications are more involved. The essential
observation here is that in order for the information in antichain to be most effective, states
of the cartesian product must be added to antichain as soon as these are discovered, even
if these have not yet been fully explored. This is achieved by maintaining, as an invariant,
that working b∀ antichain holds true; the states in working then, intuitively, constitute the
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frontier of the exploration. We achieve this by initialising working and antichain to consist
of exactly the initial state of the cartesian product, and by extending antichain with all (not
already discovered) successors for the state (spec, impl) that is popped from working . As a
side effect, this also resolves the third issue, as now both working and antichain are only
extended with states that have not yet been discovered, i.e., for which the membership test
in antichain fails, and for which insertion of such states does not invalidate the antichain
property.
The modifications we discussed above yield improved algorithms for deciding trace
refinement and stable failures refinement, see the pseudocode of Algorithms 4 and 5. We
postpone the discussion of their correctness until after discussing the modifications required
to Algorithm 3 and its proof of correctness. The example we present below illustrates the
impact of our changes.
Algorithm 4 The improved trace refinement checking algorithm. The algorithm returns
true iff L1 = (S1, ι1,→1) is refined by L2 = (S2, ι2,→2) in trace semantics.
1: procedure refines-tracenew(L1,L2)
2: let working be a stack containing a pair ({s ∈ S1 | ι1  1 s}, ι2)
3: let antichain := ∅ uniondbl ({s ∈ S1 | ι1  1 s}, ι2)
4: while working 6= ∅ do
5: pop (spec, impl) from working
6: for impl a−→2 impl ′ do
7: if a = τ then
8: spec′ := spec
9: else
10: spec′ := {s′ ∈ S1 | ∃s ∈ spec : s a 1 s′}
11: if spec′ = ∅ then
12: return false
13: if (spec′, impl ′) 6b antichain then
14: antichain := antichain uniondbl (spec′, impl ′)
15: push (spec′, impl ′) into working
16: return true
Example 5.1. Consider Example 4.3 again, but now using Algorithm 4 to check for trace
refinement. The depth-first variant of this algorithm only adds a successor state to the
working stack once, because for every other outgoing transition it will already be part of
antichain when it is discovered. This results in a maximum working stack size of at most O(1)
entries. For each state and each successor antichain membership is tested once, resulting in
O(n · k) antichain membership tests. This is an improvement compared to the depth-first
variant of Algorithm 4 of a factor n · k in the maximum working stack size and a factor k
in the number of antichain membership tests. The bounds for the breadth-first variant are
identical to the bounds for the depth-first variant, i.e., maximum O(1) working queue size
and O(n · k) number of antichain membership tests. Compared to the breadth-first variant
of Algorithm 1, this is an improvement of a factor kn in the working queue size and a factor
kn/n in the number of antichain membership tests.
We next focus on the soundness problem of Algorithm 3. The source of the incorrectness of
this algorithm can be traced back to the fact that it (partially) explores the state space of
norm(L1)× L2, rather than normfdr(L1)× L2. As illustrated by Example 3.14, this causes
the algorithm to consider states in the cartesian product that should not be considered, thus
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Algorithm 5 The improved stable failures refinement checking algorithm. The algorithm
returns true iff L1 = (S1, ι1,→1) is refined by L2 = (S2, ι2,→2) in stable failures semantics.
1: procedure refines-stable-failuresnew(L1,L2)
2: let working be a stack containing a pair ({s ∈ S1 | ι1  1 s}, ι2)
3: let antichain := ∅ uniondbl ({s ∈ S1 | ι1  1 s}, ι2)
4: while working 6= ∅ do
5: pop (spec, impl) from working
6: if stable(impl) ∧ refusals(impl) 6⊆ refusals(spec) then
7: return false
8: for impl a−→2 impl ′ do
9: if a = τ then
10: spec′ := spec
11: else
12: spec′ := {s′ ∈ S1 | ∃s ∈ spec : s a 1 s′}
13: if spec′ = ∅ then
14: return false
15: if (spec′, impl ′) 6b antichain then
16: antichain := antichain uniondbl (spec′, impl ′)
17: push (spec′, impl ′) into working
18: return true
potentially arriving at a wrong verdict. The fix to this problem is simple yet subtle, requiring
a swap of the divergence tests on lines 7 and 8, and making the further exploration of the
state (spec, impl) conditional on the specification not diverging.
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Algorithm 6 The corrected failures-divergences refinement checking algorithm. The algo-
rithm returns true iff L1 = (S1, ι1,→1) is refined by L2 = (S2, ι2,→2) in failures-divergences
semantics.
1: procedure refines-failures-divergencesnew(L1,L2)
2: let working be a stack containing a pair ({s ∈ S1 | ι1  1 s}, ι2)
3: let antichain := ∅ uniondbl ({s ∈ S1 | ι1  1 s}, ι2)
4: { done := ∅ }
5: while working 6= ∅ do
6: pop (spec, impl) from working
7: if ¬div(spec) then
8: if div(impl) then
9: return false
10: else
11: if stable(impl) ∧ refusals(impl) 6⊆ refusals(spec) then
12: return false
13: for impl a−→2 impl ′ do
14: if a = τ then
15: spec′ := spec
16: else
17: spec′ := {s′ ∈ S1 | ∃s ∈ spec : s a 1 s′}
18: if spec′ = ∅ then
19: return false
20: if (spec′, impl ′) 6b antichain then
21: antichain := antichain uniondbl (spec′, impl ′)
22: push (spec′, impl ′) into working
23: { done := {(spec, impl)} ∪ done }
24: return true
As all three algorithms presented in this section fundamentally differ (some even in the
relations that they compute) from the original ones, we cannot reuse arguments for the proof
of correctness presented in [WSS+12], which are based on invariants that do not hold in our
case, and which rely on definitions, some of which are incomparable to ours. The correctness
of our improved algorithms is claimed by the following theorem, which we repeat at the end
of this section with an explicit proof.
Theorem 5.2. Let L1 = (S1, ι1,→1) and L2 = (S2, ι2,→2) be two LTSs.
• refines-tracenew(L1, L2) returns true if and only if L1 vtr L2.
• refines-stable-failuresnew(L1, L2) returns true if and only if L1 vsfr L2.
• refines-failures-divergencesnew(L1, L2) returns true if and only if L1 vfdr L2.
For the remainder of this section we fix two LTSs L1 = (S1, ι1,→1) and L2 = (S2, ι2,→2).
We focus on the proof of correctness of Algorithm 6; the correctness proofs for Algorithm 4
for deciding trace refinement and Algorithm 5 for deciding stable failures refinement proceed
along the same lines.
First we show termination of Algorithm 6. To reason about the states that have been
processed, we have introduced a ghost variable done which is initialised as the empty set
(see line 4) and each pair (spec, impl) that is popped from working at line 6 is added to done
(line 23). For termination of the algorithm, we argue that every state in the cartesian product
gets visited, and is added to done, at most once. A crucial observation in our reasoning is
the following property of an antichain: adding elements to an antichain does not affect the
membership test of elements already included. This is formalised by the lemma below.
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Lemma 5.3. Let (Z,≤) be a partially ordered set and A ⊆ Z an antichain. For all elements
x, y ∈ Z if x b A and y 6b A then x b (A uniondbl y) holds.
Proof. Assume arbitrary elements x, y ∈ Z such that x b A and y 6b A. Recall that the
definition of A uniondbl y results in an antichain {z | z = y ∨ (z ∈ A ∧ y 6≤ z)}, because y 6b A by
assumption. Consider the following two cases:
• Case y ≤ x. Then x b (A uniondbl y) follows from the fact that y ∈ (A uniondbl y).
• Case y  x. There is an element z ∈ A such that z ≤ x by assumption that x b A.
Because y  x and z ≤ x we also know that y  z. Consequently, z ∈ (A uniondbl y) and thus
also x b (A uniondbl y).
Next, we prove that done and working are disjoint, which implies that pairs present in done
(which is a set that is easily seen to only grow) are not added to working again. Showing this
property to be true requires two additional observations, viz., (1) pairs in working and done
are contained in antichain, and (2), working contains only unique pairs, thus representing a
proper set (and, by abuse of notation, we will treat it as such). For the purpose of identifying
elements in working we define, for a given index i, the notation working i to represent the ith
pair on the stack. Now we can describe that all elements in working are unique by showing
that ∀i 6= j : working i 6= workingj holds true. The lemma below formalises these insights.
Lemma 5.4. The following invariant holds in the while loop (lines 5-23) of Algorithm 6:
(done∪working) b∀ antichain∧ (∀i 6= j : working i 6= workingj)∧ (done∩working) = ∅ (I)
Proof. Initially, the initial pair is added to both working and antichain, and done is empty,
so the invariant holds trivially upon entry of the while loop.
Maintenance. At line 6 we know that (spec, impl) b antichain from working b∀
antichain. Therefore, it holds that (done ∪ {(spec, impl)}) b∀ antichain and (working \
{(spec, impl)}) b∀ antichain. Furthermore, from ∀i 6= j : working i 6= workingj it follows
that (spec, impl) /∈ (working \ {(spec, impl)}). Upon executing line 6 we may therefore
conclude that ((done ∪ {(spec, impl)}) ∩ (working \ {(spec, impl)})) = ∅.
Next, notice that as a result of condition (spec′, impl ′) 6b antichain on line 20, we
have (spec′, impl ′) /∈ (done ∪working). Let working ′ be equal to {(spec′, impl ′)}∪ (working \
{(spec, impl)}) and done ′ be equal to {(spec, impl)}∪done. From the fact that (spec′, impl ′) /∈
working it follows that ∀i 6= j : working ′i 6= working ′j holds true. At line 21 the (spec′, impl ′)
pair is added to antichain and Lemma 5.3 ensures that (done ′ ∪ working ′) b∀ (antichain uniondbl
(spec′, impl ′)) holds. Finally, from ((done ∪ {(spec, impl)}) ∩ (working \ {(spec, impl)})) = ∅
we can also conclude that (done ′ ∩ working ′) = ∅.
Finally, we need to show that the elements in done and working are bounded by the state
space of the product normfdr(L1)× L2.
Lemma 5.5. The invariant (done ∪ working) ⊆ reachable(normfdr(L1) × L2) holds in the
while loop (lines 5-23) of Algorithm 6.
Proof. Initially, the pair ({s ∈ S1 | ι1  1 s}, ι2) is reachable by the empty trace because this
pair is the initial state of normfdr(L1) × L2 by definition. Therefore, working , which only
consists of this pair, contains pairs that are reachable as well. Moreover, done is empty, so
the invariant holds upon entry of the while loop.
Maintenance. Let (spec, impl) be a pair that is popped from working and assume
that ¬div([[spec ]]L1). Note that, by our invariant, there is a trace σ ∈ Actτ ∗, such that
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σ−→ (spec, impl). At line 13 the outgoing transition (impl , a, impl ′) is an element of →2.
Line 14 corresponds exactly to the first case of the product definition (Def. 3.2). Similarly,
line 16 corresponds exactly to the second case of the product definition where (spec, a, spec′)
is a transition in normfdr(L1) because ¬div([[spec ]]L1) holds. As such, there is a transition
(spec, impl)
a−→ (spec′, impl ′) in the product LTS. By definition of a trace and the definition of
reachable this means that (working ∪ {(spec′, impl ′)}) ⊆ reachable(normfdr(L1)× L2). From
the observation that (spec, impl) was reachable we can conclude that (done ∪ {(spec, impl)})
is a subset of the reachable states as well.
Theorem 5.6. Algorithm 6 terminates for finite state, finitely branching LTSs.
Proof. The inner for-loop is bounded as the number of outgoing transitions →2 is finite. The
total number of state pairs in normfdr(L1) × L2 is finite since S1 and S2 are finite. From
Lemma 5.5 it follows that done is a subset of the reachable state pairs. Furthermore, as
(done ∩ working) = ∅ by Lemma 5.4 we conclude that done strictly increases with every
iteration. So, only a finite number of iterations of the while loop are possible.
Note that these observations give an upper bound on the number of states that can be
explored. Especially the absence of duplicates in working and the maximisation of antichain
following from (done ∪ working) b∀ antichain do not hold for Algorithm 1, 2 and 3, as
already observed in Example 4.3.
The remainder of this section is dedicated to proving the partial correctness of Algorithm 6,
viz., that when it terminates, the algorithm correctly decides failures-divergences refinement.
Lemma 5.7. For all states (U, s), (V, s) of normfdr(L1)× L2 satisfying (U, s) ≤ (V, s) and
actions a ∈ Actτ such that (V, s) a−→ (V ′, t) there is a state (U ′, t) such that (U, s) a−→ (U ′, t)
and (U ′, t) ≤ (V ′, t).
Proof. Let L = (S , ι,→) be equal to normfdr(L1) × L2 and let L′ = (S ′1, ι′1,→′1) be equal
to normfdr(L1). Take any two state pairs such that (U, s) ≤ (V, s). Pick an arbitrary pair
(V ′, t) ∈ S and action a ∈ Actτ such that (V, s) a−→ (V ′, t). Now there are two cases to
distinguish:
• Case a = τ . Then a transition s τ−→2 t exists and V = V ′. Therefore, there is also a
transition (U, s) τ−→ (U ′, t) and U = U ′. By the assumption that (U, s) ≤ (V, s) we know
that (U ′, t) ≤ (V ′, t).
• Case a 6= τ . Then there are transitions V a−→′1 V ′ and s a−→2 t. The normalisation has, by
definition, transition V a−→′1 V ′ if and only if V ′ = {v′ ∈ S1 | ∃v ∈ [[V ]]L1 : v a 1 v′} and
¬div([[V ]]L1). Let U ′ be equal to {u′ ∈ S1 | ∃u ∈ [[U ]]L1 : u a 1 u′}. From [[U ]]L1 ⊆ [[V ]]L1 it
follows that [[U ′ ]]L1 ⊆ [[V ′ ]]L1 . Furthermore, from ¬div([[V ]]L1) it follows that ¬div([[U ]]L1).
Therefore, U a−→′1 U ′ exists and (U, s) a−→ (U ′, t) is a transition in the product with
(U ′, t) ≤ (V ′, t).
We are now in a position to formally prove the claim that we made in Section 4. For
convenience, we repeat the claim as a proposition below.
Proposition 5.8. For all states (U, s), (V, s) of normfdr(L1)× L2 satisfying (U, s) ≤ (V, s)
and for every sequence σ ∈ Actτ ∗ such that (V, s) σ−→ (V ′, t) there is a state (U ′, t) such that
(U, s)
σ−→ (U ′, t) and (U ′, t) ≤ (V ′, t).
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Proof. Let L = (S , ι,→) be equal to normfdr(L1) × L2. The proof is by induction on the
length of sequences in Actτ ∗.
Base case. Take two pairs (U, s), (V, s) ∈ S satisfying (U, s) ≤ (V, s). The empty trace
can only reach (U, s) −→ (U, s); similarly, we have (V, s) −→ (V, s). Therefore, (U, s) ≤ (V, s)
follows by assumption.
Inductive step. Suppose that the statement holds for all σ ∈ Actτ ∗ of length i. Take
arbitrary states (V, s), (V ′′, r) ∈ S and action a ∈ Actτ such that (V, s) σ a−−→ (V ′′, r). Then
there is a state (V ′, t) ∈ S such that (V, s) σ−→ (V ′, t) and (V ′, t) a−→ (V ′′, r). From the
induction hypothesis it follows that for all (U, s) ≤ (V, s) there is a state (U ′, t) ≤ (V ′, t) such
that (U, s) σ−→ (U ′, t). By Lemma 5.7 and the existence of (V ′, t) a−→ (V ′′, r) there is a state
(U ′′, r) ≤ (V ′′, r) such that (U ′, t) a−→ (U ′′, r). We thus conclude that (U, s) σ a−−→ (U ′′, r).
The correctness arguments of Algorithm 6 furthermore require a lemma showing the anti-
monotonicity of FD-witnesses. Such a result is needed because the antichain algorithms
may explore only part of the reachable state space of a cartesian product. The anti-
monotonicity property helps to show, however, that the part that is explored contains all
relevant information.
Lemma 5.9. For all states (U, s), (V, s) of normfdr(L1)×L2 satisfying (U, s) ≤ (V, s) it holds
that if (V, s) is an FD-witness then (U, s) is an FD-witness.
Proof. Take arbitrary states (U, s), (V, s) of normfdr(L1)×L2 satisfying (U, s) ≤ (V, s) and let
(V, s) be an FD-witness. It follows that ¬div([[V ]]L1) and one of the following holds: V = ∅ or
stable(s) ∧ refusals(s) * refusals([[V ]]L1) or div(s). By monotonicity, [[U ]]L1 ⊆ [[V ]]L1 implies
refusals([[U ]]L1) ⊆ refusals([[V ]]L1), and ¬div([[V ]]L1) implies ¬div([[U ]]L1). Now, (U, s) is an
FD-witness, because ¬div([[U ]]L1) holds and if V = ∅ then U = ∅, or if stable(s)∧refusals(s) *
refusals([[V ]]L1) then stable(s) ∧ refusals(s) * refusals([[U ]]L1), or div(s).
Corollary 5.10. For all states (U, s), (V, s) of normfdr(L1)× L2 where (U, s) ≤ (V, s) and
for every sequence σ ∈ Actτ ∗ it holds that if (V, s) can reach an FD-witness with σ then (U, s)
can reach an FD-witness with σ as well.
Proof. Let L = (S , ι,→) be equal to normfdr(L1)×L2. Take arbitrary states (U, s), (V, s) ∈ S
satisfying (U, s) ≤ (V, s). Let (V ′, t) be an FD-witness and σ ∈ Actτ ∗ a trace such that
(V, s)
σ−→ (V ′, t). By Lemma 5.8 there is a pair (U ′, t) ≤ (V ′, t) such that (U, s) σ−→ (U ′, t).
From lemma 5.9 it follows that state (U ′, t) is an FD-witness.
For a set of states S′ of normfdr(L1) × L2, let FDR(S′) be the predicate that is true if
and only if S′ contains an FD-witness. For a state s in the cartesian product, we define
the distance to a set of states S′ of the cartesian product as the shortest distance from
state s to a state in S′. If S′ is unreachable, the distance is set to infinity. Formally,
DistS′(s) = min{|σ| | σ ∈ traces(L) ∧ t ∈ S′ ∧ s σ−→ t}, where min{∅} is defined as ∞. For a
set of states S′′, let DistS′(S′′) denote the shortest distance among all states in S′′, formally
DistS′(S
′′) = min{DistS′(s) | s ∈ S′′}. We denote the set of all reachable FD-witnesses in the
cartesian product normfdr(L1)× L2 by F .
Lemma 5.11. For all states (U, s), (V, s) of normfdr(L1) × L2 satisfying (U, s) ≤ (V, s) it
holds that DistF ((U, s)) ≤ DistF ((V, s)).
Proof. Let L = (S , ι,→) be equal to normfdr(L1)×L2. Take arbitrary states (U, s), (V, s) ∈ S
satisfying (U, s) ≤ (V, s). From Corollary 5.10 it follows that if (V, s) can reach an FD-witness
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by the shortest trace σ then (U, s) can also reach an FD-witness with trace σ, which by
definition means that DistF ((U, s)) ≤ DistF ((V, s)).
The last lemma implies that whenever a pair is removed from the antichain due to an
insertion of a smaller pair, the inserted (smaller) state pair has a shorter or equal distance to
its closest FD-witness. This property can be used to show that the algorithm always closes
in on an FD-witness during exploration and that pruning parts of the state space does not
remove essential FD-witnesses from the reachable states. The latter property is captured by
the following lemmas.
Lemma 5.12. For all states (U, s) of normfdr(L1) × L2 it holds that if div([[U ]]L1) then
DistF ((U, s)) is ∞.
Proof. Let L = (S , ι,→) be equal to normfdr(L1)× L2 and let L′ = (S ′1, ι′1,→′1) be equal to
normfdr(L1). Take an arbitrary state (U, s) ∈ S such that div([[U ]]L1). For any action a ∈ Actτ
and state V ∈ S ′1 there is no transition U a−→′1 V by definition of normfdr. Consequently, from
(U, s), only τ -transitions due to L2 can be taken. As a result, by definition of the product
and Lemma 3.3, for any state (V, t) ∈ S such that (U, s)  (V, t) it holds that U = V . Thus,
any reachable state (V, t) also satisfies div([[V ]]L1) and therefore cannot be an FD-witness.
Hence, DistF ((U, s)) is ∞.
Lemma 5.13. If FDR(reachable(normfdr(L1)×L2)) is true then invariant II holds for every
iteration of the while loop (lines 5-23) of Algorithm 6:
DistF (done) > DistF (working) ∧ DistF (working) = DistF (antichain) (II)
Proof. Assume that FDR(reachable(normfdr(L1) × L2)) holds, so there is a reachable FD-
witness.
Initialisation. The set done is empty, so DistF(done) = DistF(∅) = ∞. For working ,
which at this point only contains the initial state, the witness is reachable and therefore
DistF(working) < ∞. The initial state is also added to antichain. Thus DistF(done) >
DistF (working) ∧ DistF (working) = DistF (antichain).
Maintenance. Assume that working is not empty and that DistF (done) > DistF (working)
and DistF(working) = DistF(antichain) hold. At line 6 a pair (spec, impl) is taken from
working , so working , which by invariant I represents a set, becomes equal to working \
{(spec, impl)}. Let done ′ be equal to done ∪ {(spec, impl)} and let N = DistF ((spec, impl)).
There are three cases to distinguish.
• Case N > DistF(working ∪ {(spec, impl)}). Removing (spec, impl) from working did
not change its distance, so DistF(working) = DistF(working ∪ {(spec, impl)}). Because
N > DistF (working), adding this pair to done results in DistF (working) < DistF (done ′) ≤
DistF(done). Consider the outgoing transitions (impl , a, impl ′) ∈→2 at line 13. The
resulting pairs (spec′, impl ′) must have a distance of at least DistF(working), because
N − 1 ≥ DistF(working). Let working ′ be equal to working ∪ {(spec′, impl ′)}. Then
DistF(working) = DistF(working ′). Let antichain ′ be antichain if (spec′, impl ′) was not
inserted and antichain uniondbl (spec′, impl ′) otherwise. By the invariant it follows that N − 1 ≥
DistF (antichain) and so by Lemma 5.11 if (spec′, impl ′) is inserted into antichain its dis-
tance will also not change. Therefore, DistF (done ′) > DistF (working ′)∧DistF (working ′) =
DistF (antichain ′).
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• Case 0 < N ≤ DistF(working ∪ {(spec, impl)}). Observe that N must be equal to
DistF(working ∪ {(spec, impl)}). From Lemma 5.12 follows that ¬div([[spec ]]L1) and so
the successors of (spec, impl) are explored. As 0 < N , there must be some succes-
sors (spec′, impl ′) at line 13 such that DistF((spec′, impl ′)) < N . Towards a contradic-
tion, assume that one of these successors (spec′, impl ′) is included in antichain, i.e.,
(spec′, impl ′) b antichain. In that case, we can conclude that DistF((spec′, impl ′)) ≥
DistF(antichain) by Lemma 5.11. Consequently, it follows that DistF((spec′, impl ′)) ≥
DistF(working ∪ {(spec, impl)}) = N , which contradicts with DistF((spec′, impl ′)) < N .
Therefore, none of them should already be included in antichain. Let working ′ be equal
to working ∪ {(spec′, impl ′)}. For some successor (spec′, impl ′) 6b antichain that is added
to working at line 22, we observe that DistF((spec′, impl ′)) < DistF((spec, impl)) and
hence DistF (working ′) < DistF (working ∪{(spec, impl)}). Therefore also Dist(working ′) <
DistF(done ∪ {(spec, impl)}). Finally, Dist(antichain uniondbl (spec′, impl ′)) = DistF(working ′)
follows from DistF ((spec′, impl ′)) < DistF (antichain).
• Case N = 0. The state (spec, impl) is checked for the FD-witness conditions and the
algorithm terminates.
We conclude with the following result, which underlies the correctness of Algorithm 6.
Theorem 5.14. Algorithm 6 returns false if and only if an FD-witness is reachable in the
product normfdr(L1)× L2.
Proof. We prove both implications by contraposition.
=⇒ ) Assume that Algorithm 6 returns false. This occurs when the current pair
(spec, impl) satisfies the conditions of an FD-witness, as shown in lines 7, 8, 11 and 18 of
Algorithm 6. All pairs taken from working are reachable according to Lemma 5.5, so this
FD-witness is also reachable.
⇐= ) Assume that an FD-witness is reachable in the product of normfdr(L1)× L2, i.e.,
F 6= ∅. Then invariant II of Lemma 5.13 holds:
DistF (done) > DistF (working) ∧ DistF (working) = DistF (antichain)
Towards a contradiction, assume that Algorithm 6 returns true. The algorithm returns
true if and only if working is empty, which means that DistF(working) = DistF(∅) =∞.
The initial state ι of normfdr(L1) × L2 is equal to ({s ∈ S1 | ι1  1 s}, ι2) and can reach
an FD-witness by assumption. Therefore, DistF(ι) < ∞. Initially ι was inserted into
antichain so by Lemma 5.3 follows that ι b antichain and from Lemma 5.11 it follows
that DistF (antichain) <∞. Contradiction.
We here note that analogues of Theorem 5.14 for Algorithms 4 and 5 can be proved along
the same lines. In particular, invariants I and II, fundamental in proving termination, and
proved in Lemmas 5.4 and 5.5, can be shown to hold for both algorithms using the same
arguments (where, of course, the counterpart of invariant II relies on a distance to the
set of TR-witnesses or SF-witnesses). Proposition 5.8 also holds for the cartesian product
norm(L1)× L2, and Lemma 5.9 and Corollary 5.10 hold for TR-witnesses and SF-witnesses
in the cartesian product norm(L1)× L2. Without going into these details, we here claim the
correctness for Algorithms 4 and 5.
Theorem 5.15. Algorithm 4 returns false if and only if a TR-witness is reachable in the
product norm(L1)× L2. Algorithm 5 returns false if and only if an SF-witness is reachable
in the product norm(L1)× L2.
28 M. LAVEAUX, J. F. GROOTE, AND T.A.C. WILLEMSE
We finish with restating the formal claim of correctness of all three improved algorithms.
Theorem 5.2. Let L1 = (S1, ι1,→1) and L2 = (S2, ι2,→2) be two LTSs.
• refines-tracenew(L1, L2) returns true if and only if L1 vtr L2.
• refines-stable-failuresnew(L1, L2) returns true if and only if L1 vsfr L2.
• refines-failures-divergencesnew(L1, L2) returns true if and only if L1 vfdr L2.
Proof. From Theorem 5.14 we can conclude that Algorithm 6 returns false if and only if an
FD-witness is reachable. By Theorem 3.21 an FD-witness is only reachable if and only if L1
does not refine L2 in failures-divergences semantics. Virtually the same arguments apply for
trace and stable failures refinement.
6. Experimental Validation
We have conducted several experiments to compare the run time of the various algorithms to
show that solving the identified issues actually improves the run time performance in practice.
For this purpose we have implemented a depth-first and breadth-first variant for each of
the original algorithms (Algorithms 1, 2 and 3) and improved algorithms (Algorithms 4, 5
and 6) in a branch of the mCRL21 toolset [BGK+19] as part of the ltscompare tool, which is
implemented in C++. As the name of the tool suggests it can be used to compare various
equivalence relations and refinement relations between labelled transition systems.
The data structures used in these implementations compute most concepts, e.g., the
antichain membership test and insertion, in the same way. However, the implementations
of Algorithms 5 and 6 perform the check at line 6, or line 11 respectively, according to
the definition of refusals we presented in Definition 2.5, whereas the implementations of
Algorithms 2 and 3 compute the refusal check with an additional local search, according to
the definition given in [WSS+12], see also Remark 2.6. Note that Algorithms 2 and 3 apply
refusals to any, possibly unstable, implementation and specification states. Therefore, for
Algorithms 2 and 3 we have implemented the refusals computation for any state, omitting
the requirement that the given state is stable.
We first revisit Example 4.3 in Section 6.1, illustrating that the performance overhead we
predict for the original algorithm for checking trace refinement also manifests itself in practice.
In Section 6.2, we then analyse the performance of the algorithms on practical examples
consisting of a model of an industrial system and models of concurrent data structures.
Finally, in Section 6.3, we analyse the effect of using a cheap state space minimisation
algorithm on the total run time of the algorithms.
All experiments and measurements have been performed on a machine with an Intel Core
i7-7700HQ CPU 2.80Ghz and a 16GiB memory limit imposed by ulimit -Sv 16777216. The
source modifications and experiments can be obtained from the downloadable package [Lav19].
6.1. Experiment I: A Pathological Example. We have used our implementations of
Algorithms 1 and 4 to measure the run time (in seconds) for checking the trace refinement
Lkn vtr Lkn, for all combinations of parameters n, k ∈ {10, 20, . . . , 500}, as described in
Example 4.3. The results of these measurements are shown as a 3D-plot in Figure 1.
These plots show a quadratic growth of Algorithm 1 in the parameter k and a linear
growth in the parameter n. For Algorithm 4 the asymptotic growth is linear in both k and
1www.mcrl2.org
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n. These observed growths coincide with the analysis that was presented in Example 4.3
for Algorithm 1 and on page 20 for Algorithm 4. Note that the scale of the vertical axes
of both plots, displaying the run time, differs by two orders of magnitude and the highest
runtime (for the n = 500 and k = 500 case) of Algorithm 1 is a factor 170 higher than that
of Algorithm 4. As there is no difference in the data structures the difference in run time is
entirely due to the different way of inspecting and extending working and antichain.
Figure 1: The run time results for Example 4.3 using the depth-first variant of Algorithm 1
on the left and our Algorithm 4 on the right.
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The breadth-first variant of Algorithm 1 was unable to complete the smallest, i.e., n = k = 10,
case within the given memory limit. However, as shown in Figure 2 the run time performance
of the breadth-first variant of the improved algorithm is almost equivalent to its depth-first
variant.
Figure 2: The run time for Example 4.3 using the breadth-first variant of Algorithm 4.
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6.2. Experiment II: Practical Examples. The experiments that we consider are taken
from two sources. First, a model of an industrial system that first exposed the performance
issues in practice of a control system modelled in the Dezyne language [vBGH+17] . This
example is of a more traditional flavour, in which the specification is an abstract description
of the behaviours at the external interface of a control system, and the implementation is a
detailed model that interacts with underlying services to implement the expected interface.
For reasons of confidentiality, the industrial model cannot be made available.
Second, we consider several linearisability tests of concurrent data structures. These
models have been taken from [Pav18], and consist of six implementations of concurrent data
types that, when trace refining their specifications, are guaranteed to be linearisable. As
in [WSS+12], we approximate trace refinement by the stronger stable failures refinement. For
these models, the implementation and specification pairs are based on the same descriptions;
the difference between the two is that the specification uses a simple construct to guarantee
that each method of the concurrent data structure executes atomically. This significantly
reduces the non-determinism and the number of transitions in the specification models.
In Table 1 the origin of each model, the number of states and transitions of each
implementation and specification LTS, and whether the stable failures refinement relation
holds is shown.
Table 1: The number of states and transitions in each benchmark.
Model Ref. states spec trans. spec vsfr states impl trans. impl
Coarse set [HS08] 50 488 64 729 True 55 444 145 043
Fine-grained set [HS08] 3 720 3 305 True 5 077 9 006
Industrial - 24 45 True 24 551 45 447
Lazy set [HS08] 3 565 3 980 True 24 496 41 431
Optimistic set [HS08] 25 435 28 154 True 234 332 389 344
Non-blocking queue [SHC00] 1 248 1 473 False 3 030 5 799
Treiber stack [Tre86] 87 389 124 740 True 205 634 564 862
The run time measurements of both Algorithms 2 and 5 with both the depth-first and
breadth-first variants is shown in Table 2. The run times that we report are the averages
obtained from five consecutive runs.
Table 2: Run time comparison between Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 5 using depth-first (df)
and breadth-first (bf) exploration.
Model Alg. 2 df (s) Alg. 2 bf (s) Alg. 5 df (s) Alg. 5 bf (s)
Coarse set 9.15 † 8.61 9.06
Fine-grained set 0.37 † 0.32 0.46
Industrial 1.36 296.29 0.15 0.17
Lazy set 1.19 † 1.02 1.26
Optimistic set 16.96 † 14.13 22.67
Non-blocking queue 0.03 0.17 0.02 0.09
Treiber stack 148.39 † 137.52 352.59
Here, we observe that the depth-first variant of both algorithms perform similarly with
a small run time advantage for Algorithm 5. However, for the breadth-first variants our
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algorithm is able to complete all experiments, whereas Algorithm 2 reaches the memory
limit, indicated by †, in five cases and only completes two cases successfully.
To gain more insight into the performance differences between both algorithms we repeat
the experiments and report a number of performance metrics. The reported metrics are
the maximum working size and the number of antichain membership test that fail (misses),
succeed (hits) and the maximum antichain size during the exploration. We report the
maximum size instead of its size upon termination as these do not necessarily coincide,
because inserting an element can evict one or more pairs in antichain. The following
two tables (Tables 3 and 4) show the discussed metrics for the depth-first variant of both
algorithms.
Table 3: Performance metrics for the depth-first variant of Algorithm 2.
Model working max antichain hits antichain misses antichain max
Coarse set 96 93 330 58 438 55 444
Fine-grained set 60 5 786 7 575 5 077
Lazy set 61 21 184 30 771 24 496
Optimistic set 96 234 692 354 068 238 726
Non-blocking queue 52 548 672 591
Treiber stack 101 1 238 727 756 692 234 118
Industrial 74 36 544 43 419 43 091
Table 4: Performance metrics for the depth-first variant of Algorithm 5.
Model working max antichain hits antichain misses antichain max
Coarse set 96 93 330 58 438 55 444
Fine-grained set 60 5 786 7 575 5 077
Lazy set 61 21 184 30 771 24 496
Optimistic set 96 234 692 354 068 238 728
Non-blocking queue 43 520 641 634
Treiber stack 101 1 238 727 756 692 234 119
Industrial 69 36 369 43 090 43 091
We observe that only for the industrial and non-blocking queue models the performance
metrics are different. An explanation for this is that because the antichain membership test
is delayed (in Algorithm 2), more pairs are added to working and these additional pairs
increase the number of antichain checks. In all other cases, the difference in run time can
only be the result of the different refusal computation implementation, as the number of
antichain operations is the same.
The following two tables (Tables 5 and 6) show the obtained performance metrics for
the breadth-first variants of both algorithms. In the experiments where the refinement
checking terminates early, due to reaching the memory limit, we report the last observed
measurements.
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Table 5: Performance indicators for the breadth-first variant of Algorithm 2.
Model working max antichain hits antichain misses antichain max
Coarse set 4 710 289 13 870 7 807 403 3 629
Fine-grained set 6 604 516 180 669 15 547 890 1 900
Lazy set 6 726 497 130 523 14 852 835 4 306
Optimistic set 6 366 524 38 649 14 238 042 4 439
Non-blocking queue 6 262 3 078 14 560 274
Treiber stack 5 829 902 76 114 8 340 606 4 811
Industrial 549 263 5 459 028 12 888 388 43 091
Table 6: Performance indicators for the breadth-first variant of Algorithm 5.
Model working max antichain hits antichain misses antichain max
Coarse set 3 411 96 167 60 332 55 444
Fine-grained set 434 7 192 9 657 5 077
Lazy set 1 748 24 340 35 192 24 496
Optimistic set 15 209 292 525 434 218 234 352
Non-blocking queue 338 3 426 4 032 2 675
Treiber stack 139 218 2 411 614 1 523 830 214 795
Industrial 2 243 36 369 43 090 43 091
From these results it is clear to see that for the breadth-first variant of Algorithm 2, delaying
the antichain insertion of discovered state pairs results in an enormous overhead. The size of
the antichain remains quite small, which causes many discovered pairs to fail the antichain
membership test. As each pair that fails the membership test is added to working , it causes
the working queue to grow rapidly, until it reaches the memory limit. On the other hand,
for Algorithm 5 we can observe that the number of successful (and unsuccessful) antichain
membership test is quite similar to its depth-first variant. There can be some differences
between these variants as the pairs are discovered in a different order. The increase of the
working size has the same reason as for ordinary breadth-first search, which depends on the
out degree of the visited pairs.
To verify that the difference in performance of the depth-first variants is due to the
changes of the refusal computation we have implemented another variant of Algorithm 2 with
the stability check of impl added. The run time impact of this change for both depth-first
and breadth-first variants of Algorithm 2 is shown in Table 7.
Table 7: Run time results for Algorithm 2 with the stability check of impl .
Model Alg. 2 df (s) Alg. 2 bf (s)
Coarse set 9.59 †
Fine-grained set 0.36 †
Industrial 0.17 26.32
Lazy set 1.12 †
Optimistic set 15.85 †
Non-blocking queue 0.03 †
Treiber stack 156.67 †
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As expected, the run time for this alternative depth-first variant closely matches the run time
of the depth-first variant of the improved algorithm. The alternative breadth-first variant
of Algorithm 2 is still not able to complete most experiments, but the industrial case has
improved quite significantly. However, the non-blocking queue experiment now reaches the
set memory limit. For this we provide the following explanation. Note that in case of a failing
refinement the exploration stops when a suitable (SF-)witness has been found, which must
exist as stable failures refinement does not hold. Recall that the computation of refusals for
(possibly) unstable states as defined in [WSS+12], see Remark 2.6, has been implemented
using a separate local search for stable states. We think that in the previous case such an
SF-witness was found for an unstable state using this local search. However, in the alternative
version the algorithm continues the exploration of the LTSs when encountering an unstable
state (in L2), which causes the working queue to reach the memory limit.
Finally, we repeat the same experiments while checking for failures-divergences refinement.
This has only been done for Algorithm 6 as the original algorithm for failures-divergences
refinement is incorrect. The run time measurements and the expected result of the failures-
divergences refinement check are presented in Table 8.
Table 8: The run time results for checking failures-divergences refinement using Algorithm 6.
Model Alg. 6 df (s) Alg. 6 bf (s) vfdr
Coarse set 8.68 9.29 True
Fine-grained set 0.33 0.48 True
Industrial 0.05 0.05 False
Lazy set 1.04 1.33 True
Optimistic set 14.55 23.81 True
Non-blocking queue 0.08 0.1 True
Treiber stack 140.7 363.34 True
The run time results of Table 8 show that deciding failures-divergences refinement has a
similar performance to deciding stable failures.
6.3. State Space Minimisation as Preprocessing. The size of the transition systems
has a major impact on the practical run time of the refinement checking algorithms we
studied, as can also be seen from, e.g., Tables 1 and 2. Note that this is particularly true of
the size of the specification LTS, whose normal form can be exponentially larger than the
specification itself. As an alternative to the pruning achieved using antichains, reducing the
size of the specification as a preprocessing step to checking for refinement may therefore be
an effective tool in improving on the practical run time of these algorithms. Of course, it is
desirable that the computational overhead of the reduction remains minimal. One possibility
is to minimise transition systems using one of the many equivalence relations available for
labelled transition systems, see, e.g. [vG93, BGR16]. When choosing such an equivalence it
is important that it has the property that, apart from an appealing run time complexity,
the observations, i.e., weaktraces, failures and divergences, that are extracted from equivalent
states are the same.
Strong bisimilarity is known to preserve the aforementioned property. However, a more
substantial state space reduction can often be achieved by considering equivalences that treat
the special action τ as invisible, as the given LTSs often contain τ -transitions. In [Ros10],
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Roscoe suggests to use a variant of weak bisimulation, viz., divergence respecting weak
bisimulation, to minimise a transition system. For divergence respecting weak bisimulation it
is known that it is a suitable abstraction; see the following theorem [Ros10, Theorem 9.2].
Theorem 6.1. Let L = (S , ι,→) be an LTS. For two states s, t ∈ S that are diver-
gence respecting weak bisimilar it holds that weaktraces(s) = weaktraces(t), divergences(s) =
divergences(t), failures(s) = failures(t). Hence, also failures⊥(s) = failures⊥(t).
From a computational point of view, however, (variants of) weak bisimulation are not
particularly promising. For instance, the best known algorithm [RT08] for computing weak
bisimulation has a worst-case time complexity of O(m · n), where n is the number of states
and m the number of transitions. Such run time complexities are non-neglible and may result
in an undesirably overhead.
In practice, weak bisimulation is known to often coincide with branching bisimulation.
Branching bisimulation is stronger than weak bisimulation, but has the far more appealing
worst-case run time complexity of O(m · log n) [GJKW17].2 Moreover, the algorithm that
decides branching bisimulation equivalence between two states can also be adapted to a min-
imisation procedure that finds a minimum within the same time complexity. While branching
bisimulation is not a suitable abstraction, divergence-preserving branching bisimulation, which
is more discriminating than divergence-respecting weak bisimulation [vG93], is a suitable
abstraction. This means that, if s and t are related by a divergence-preserving branching
bisimulation relation then they are also related in divergence-respecting weak bisimulation
relation and as such Theorem 6.1 states that the observations are equivalent. Moreover,
the algorithm for minimising a transition system modulo branching bisimulation is easily
adapted (i.e., without increasing the run time complexity) to one for divergence-preserving
branching bisimulation.
We have made the preprocessing step of minimisation modulo divergence-preserving
branching bisimulation available as an option in our tool. In Table 9 the number of
states and transitions of each model of Section 6.2, after minimisation modulo divergence-
preserving branching bisimulation, and whether the specification and implementation LTSs
are divergence-preserving branching bisimilar is shown.
Table 9: The number of states and transitions after diverging preserving branching bisimula-
tion minimisation and whether the LTSs are equivalent in divergence-preserving
branching bisimulation semantics denoted by -db.
Model states spec trans. spec -db states impl trans. impl
Coarse set 1 089 3 618 True 1 089 3 618
Fine-grained set 92 210 True 92 210
Industrial 24 45 False 4 626 14 380
Lazy set 92 210 True 92 210
Optimistic set 170 410 True 170 410
Non-blocking queue 163 378 False 119 274
Treiber stack 7 988 26 070 True 7 988 26 070
2In [GJKW17] the time complexity was reported as being O(m(log |Actτ | + logn)), but more careful
analysis showed that it was O(m(logn)). The detailed analysis will appear in a future publication.
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Observe that for most of the models, the minimised implementation and specification LTSs
are of equal size; indeed, in those cases the implementation and specification are divergence-
preserving branching bisimulation equivalent, so no further stable failures refinement check
would be needed. One option would therefore be to use the minimisation for both imple-
mentation and specification LTSs. However, in practice we expect3 that the size of the
implementation is of less importance. Moreover, also minimising the implementation could
be less effective in case the refinement relation between specification and implementation
does not hold, in which case the refinement check will probably quickly determine this
fact. We therefore measure the effect of using minimised specifications, but unmodified
implementations. The run time measurements of checking stable failures refinement using
Algorithms 2 and 5 using the minimised specification LTS is shown in Table 10. The time
that it takes to compute the divergence-preserving branching bisimulation minimisation is
presented in the last column and the other measurements are the run time of the algorithm
including preprocessing.
Table 10: Run time comparison between the original algorithm (Algorithm 2) and the im-
proved algorithm (Algorithm 5) using depth-first (df) and breadth-first (bf) explo-
ration where the specification is reduced modulo divergence-preserving branching
bisimulation.
Model Alg. 2 df (s) Alg. 2 bf (s) Alg. 5 df (s) Alg. 5 bf (s) Reduction (s)
Coarse set 0.74 † 0.69 0.69 0.10
Fine-grained set 0.04 † 0.04 0.04 0.01
Industrial 1.38 293.1 0.16 0.17 0.01
Lazy set 0.21 † 0.15 0.15 0.01
Optimistic set 2.52 † 1.59 1.57 0.04
Non-blocking queue 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01
Treiber stack 8.19 † 6.61 11.71 0.24
Comparing these results with Table 2 shows that reducing the specification modulo divergence-
preserving branching bisimulation can indeed substantially improve the performance of the
antichain-based algorithms. In particular, it never degrades the performance of our algorithms
as the preprocessing time is negligible. For failures-divergences refinement the results, using
Algorithm 6, are similar, as is shown in Table 11.
3Additional experiments where we applied this minimisation, that are not presented in here, show that
only for the Treiber stack model there is an advantage to minimising the implementation, obtaining a run
time of three seconds to determine stable failures refinement.
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Table 11: The run time results for checking failures-divergences refinement using Algorithm 6
where the specification is reduced module divergence-preserving branching bisimu-
lation.
Model Alg. 6 df (s) Alg. 6 bf (s)
Coarse set 0.75 0.7
Fine-grained set 0.04 0.04
Industrial 0.05 0.06
Lazy set 0.15 0.15
Optimistic set 1.61 1.7
Non-blocking queue 0.02 0.02
Treiber stack 6.76 12.13
7. Conclusion
Our study of the antichain-based algorithms for deciding trace refinement, stable failures
refinement and failures-divergences refinement presented in [WSS+12] revealed that the
failures-divergences refinement algorithm is incorrect. All three algorithms perform subopti-
mally when implemented using a depth-first search strategy and poorly when implemented
using a breadth-first search strategy. Furthermore, all three algorithms violate the claimed
antichain property. We propose alternative algorithms for which we have shown correctness
and which utilise proper antichains. Our experiments indicate significant performance im-
provements for deciding trace refinement, stable failures refinement and a performance of
deciding failures-divergences refinement that is comparable to deciding stable failures refine-
ment. We also show that preprocessing using divergence-preserving branching bisimulation
offers substantial performance benefits. The implementation of our algorithms is available
in the open source toolset mCRL2 [BGK+19] and is currently used as the backbone in the
commercial F-MDE toolset Dezyne; see also [vBGH+17].
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